Florida Supreme Court says maintaining innocence after being found guilty can be used against you in sentencing

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

Wow.

 

EDIT - Tweeter is incorrect, this references how maintaining your innocence (after being found guilty) and waiving your right to maintain silence can be used against you in sentencing.

[Kal-El814]

[Fizzzzle]

Well, that's... something. It's like taking plea deals and calling them a little bitch.

[Jason]

shithole country

[CastlevaniaNut18]

The fuck. 

[Firewithin]

the only consequences there is, are what makes everything worse for everybody else since there are/were zero consequences to the dogshit things that this country is doing us

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

conservative judges making shit up as they go? the dickens you say?!

[Kal-El814]

The cocksure swagger when you’re absolutely, 100% sure that you and all of yours will never, ever, be on the receiving end of this.

[Guest]

Thread title is poor

 

Quote

In a noncapital case, the statutory maximum
sentence is a legal sentence by virtue of the conviction alone. See §
921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“The trial court judge may impose a
sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any
offense . . . .”). As the First District correctly observed:
In Davis’s case, . . . the judge had statutory authority to
impose a sentence of up to fifteen years. § 775.082(1)(d),
Fla. Stat.

 

He could do so with a remorseful defendant,
and he could do so with an unremorseful defendant. He
could do so with a defendant taking responsibility for his
crimes, and he could do so with a defendant unwilling to
take responsibility. The conviction alone was enough to
justify the sentence. No “aggravator” or additional
findings were necessary.
Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965. In other words, the Legislature
empowered the trial court to sentence Davis to fifteen years’
imprisonment whether or not he took responsibility for his actions, 
because it was the fact of his conviction that subjected him to a
sentence up to and including the statutory maximum. So the
statutory scheme applicable here, unlike the statute governing
aggravating circumstances in capital cases that was applied in
Pope, does not foreclose consideration in sentencing of the
defendant’s failure to accept responsibility.

 

The court did not give additional punishment because of lack of remorse post-conviction, the state had already recommended the maximum allowed under the statute, and that is what the trial court levied. What happened is that the trial court more or less said "here are a bunch of factors, including your refusal to admit responsibility, we are accepting the recommendation of the maximum sentence".

[TwinIon]

I'm not a lawyer, but after reading most of the opinion, I don't think it says what that tweet says it does.

 

It says that, during sentencing, if you choose to speak and show no remorse, that can be held against you. So you can say nothing at all, and I don't believe they can characterize that as "lack of remorse." If you do choose to speak, and maintain your innocence during sentencing, that can be considered by the court.

 

I don't agree with that ruling, because it assumes the court's infallibility, but it's certainly not like you can take the fifth all the way through sentencing and the court can take that as "lack of remorse."

[Guest]

Here is another section that is important

 

Quote

The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal
Punishment Code, in accordance with Davis’s sentencing
scoresheet, was 118.125 months (approximately nine years and ten
months) and the statutory maximum sentence was fifteen years.
The State requested that the court impose the maximum sentence
because of Davis’s numerous previous convictions and violent 
history, while defense counsel urged the court to impose the lowest
permissible sentence per the scoresheet. The law therefore provided
the trial judge with a range from approximately ten to fifteen years
to which he could sentence Davis. In fashioning the sentence, the
trial court considered that Davis had “an extensive violent history
here and a lot of it involves a firearm,” including, “a second degree
murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted armed
robbery with a firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, discharging a firearm on school
property, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, battery on a law
enforcement officer, felony battery.” The court categorized this as “a
violent, unfortunate history that we’re dealing with” and noted that
the offense for which Davis was to be sentenced also involved a
firearm.

The trial judge had numerous valid reasons for imposing the
maximum sentence here, but, as stated previously, he did not need
to articulate any reason. The judge was statutorily authorized to
impose a sentence up to fifteen years based solely on the fact of the
conviction, regardless of any sentencing considerations and
whether or not Davis took responsibility for his actions. “The 
conviction alone was enough to justify the sentence. No ‘aggravator’
or additional findings were necessary.” Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965-
66. The Supreme Court has long recognized that due process
permits “a sentencing judge [to] exercise a wide discretion in the
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the
kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by
law.” Williams, 337 U.S. at 246. The Court has “never [called into]
doubt[] the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). Whether a defendant says
nothing at sentencing or takes full responsibility and is able to
show that he is a pillar of the community, a judge retains the
discretion to impose the maximum sentence.

Further, while a defendant does have the right to maintain his
innocence by pleading not guilty and going to trial, and the right to
remain silent, Davis chose to voluntarily allocute at his sentencing
and thus waived his right to remain silent. And because Davis
waived the right to maintain his silence, the trial court did not
violate Davis’s right to due process by considering the words that
Davis voluntarily offered in imposing a sentence. “Just as a jury 
weighs a defendant’s testimony once he waives his Fifth
Amendment privilege at trial, a judge may consider a defendant’s
freely offered allocution . . . during sentencing.” United States v.
Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 652 (11th Cir. 2014). This is true even if
those words are detrimental to the defendant.

 

So basically the judge didn't need a reason to give the max, had a TON of reasons that nobody would dispute to give the max, and to top it off the guy explicitly waived his right to remain silent and thus not self-incriminate by actively speaking during the allocution section of the sentencing hearing.

[CitizenVectron]

44 minutes ago, sblfilms said:

Thread title is poor

 

 

The court did not give additional punishment because of lack of remorse post-conviction, the state had already recommended the maximum allowed under the statute, and that is what the trial court levied. What happened is that the trial court more or less said "here are a bunch of factors, including your refusal to admit responsibility, we are accepting the recommendation of the maximum sentence".

 

38 minutes ago, TwinIon said:

I'm not a lawyer, but after reading most of the opinion, I don't think it says what that tweet says it does.

 

It says that, during sentencing, if you choose to speak and show no remorse, that can be held against you. So you can say nothing at all, and I don't believe they can characterize that as "lack of remorse." If you do choose to speak, and maintain your innocence during sentencing, that can be considered by the court.

 

I don't agree with that ruling, because it assumes the court's infallibility, but it's certainly not like you can take the fifth all the way through sentencing and the court can take that as "lack of remorse."

 

Correct, the initial read from the tweeter is wrong. However, it's not much better, since it's effectively saying that maintaining your innocence (even after being found guilty) can be used against you in sentencing.

[Guest]

13 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

Correct, the initial read from the tweeter is wrong. However, it's not much better, since it's effectively saying that maintaining your innocence (even after being found guilty) can be used against you in sentencing.

The court actually gave a good explanation of why the case at hand is different from the case the defendant cited. Here there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances that change what a judge can sentence a person to. They have the authority to levy a sentence anywhere between the to end points afforded by the law. Neither lack of remorse, nor expression of remorse can change those boundaries.