Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (27 June 2024) - US/Israel in talks to supply 8 Patriot systems to Ukraine

[CitizenVectron]

8 minutes ago, Signifyin(g)Monkey said:

I wouldn’t be too surprised if that’s the new line.  Crazier things are already being said.

 

The Russian partisans over at naked capitalism are already saying this war was a pre-emptive defensive strike against an invasion of Russia NATO had planned to execute in February.  I’ve been directed to this link more than once.

 

Lol, with what army? The 5,000 tripwire forces in the Baltics? Mind you, after seeing the state of Russian forces, they might have been able to make it to Moscow...

[PaladinSolo]

1 minute ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Lol, with what army? The 5,000 tripwire forces in the Baltics? Mind you, after seeing the state of Russian forces, they might have been able to make it to Moscow...

To add to this if NATO was going to invade Russia, why wouldnt it just join Ukraine in kicking their ass. Though I suppose to these idiots Ukraine is really Russia and we were going to invade Ukraine aka Russia. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 10 April 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces made territorial gains in Mariupol in the past 24 hours and continued to reinforce operations along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis but did not make other territorial gains. Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on

 

 

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Russian forces made territorial gains in Mariupol in the past 24 hours and continued to reinforce operations along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis but did not make other territorial gains. Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on April 10, isolating the remaining Ukrainian defenders in two main locations: the main port of Mariupol in the southwest and the Azovstal steel plant in the east. Russian forces, including a convoy of hundreds of vehicles captured in Maxar Technologies imagery on April 8, continue to reinforce Russia’s offensive in Izyum to link up with Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces bisected Mariupol from the city center to the coast on April 10, isolating the remaining Ukrainian defenders in the southwestern port and eastern Azovstal Steel Plant.
• Russian forces again made little to no progress in frontal assaults in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but continue to cohere further reinforcements.
• Maxar Technologies satellite imagery captured hundreds of Russian vehicles in Kharkiv Oblast redeploying to support Russian operations near Izyum.
• Ukrainian counterattacks may threaten Kherson city in the coming days or weeks.

 

The Russian Defense Ministry is reportedly offering cash bonuses to incentivize forces withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to reenter combat operations. Radio Svoboda published images of a document on April 10 that it reported was issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on April 2 offering specific bonuses for Russian troops in Ukraine.[1] The document specifies large payments including 300,000 rubles for destroying a fixed-wing aircraft, 200,000 for destroying a helicopter, and 50,000 for armored vehicles and artillery. Radio Svoboda stated the payments are intended to coerce units withdrawn from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions to reenter combat. We have previously reported several instances of Russian soldiers refusing orders to return to Ukraine after being pulled back.[2]

 

Russian forces are implementing increasingly draconian measures to conscript previously ineligible personnel. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 10 that Russian forces are now conscripting previously ineligible categories of people, including those with childhood disabilities and workers in protected industries.[3] The GUR reported that DNR/LNR authorities are enabling traffic inspectors to issue on-the-spot conscription notices and are establishing checkpoints on key highways. DNR and Russian military police are additionally reportedly destroying documents granting exemptions—such as medical records or work certificates—to forcibly conscript people

 

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[69los]

2 hours ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's latest intelligence briefing:

 

 

[CayceG]

I just heard some news about my friends Tanya and Vova. 

 

They are in Zaporizhzhia. Vova is on his way to university and traveled out of his village with his parents. They had to traverse over a dozen Russian checkpoints, at times being strip searched. But they're fine and out of the Russian occupied area. 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

Uh, is Lukashenko about to get disappeared?

[CayceG]

Vostochny Cosmodrome is under construction and nearly finished, so I'm betting it's as part of the ribbon cutting for the cosmodrome. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

8 minutes ago, CayceG said:

Vostochny Cosmodrome is under construction and nearly finished, so I'm betting it's as part of the ribbon cutting for the cosmodrome. 

 

Also, tomorrow is Kosmonautics Day in former Soviet countries and they can't meet at Baykonur because Kazakhstan told the Kremlin to go fuck itself when asked to support the war.

[Zaku3]

17 hours ago, Signifyin(g)Monkey said:

I wouldn’t be too surprised if that’s the new line.  Crazier things are already being said.

 

The Russian partisans over at naked capitalism are already saying this war was a pre-emptive defensive strike against an invasion of Russia NATO had planned to execute in February.  I’ve been directed to this link more than once.

 

Tbh they should just own it. It's perfectly understandable not wanting a country to join a military alliance that opposes you. Morale would probably be higher like that. 

[Iculus]

Why is this still a thing? Send mi5, SAS, cia, navy seals, Israeli special forces, french counter terrorism division, and whoever fuckall you need to kill this motherfucker. Putin has obviously lost his goddammed mind, and needs to be put down.

[Air_Delivery]

13 minutes ago, Iculus said:

Why is this still a thing? Send mi5, SAS, cia, navy seals, Israeli special forces, french counter terrorism division, and whoever fuckall you need to kill this motherfucker. Putin has obviously lost his goddammed mind, and needs to be put down.

 

 

1) It would be a suicide mission. Seals aren't some magical solution to everything. Putin is well guarded and he keeps his movements under wraps. And they would have to somehow get over hundreds of miles of well protected air space. 

2) Nukes

[PaladinSolo]

 

 

 

[Iculus]

1 minute ago, Air_Delivery said:

 

 

1) It would be a suicide mission.

2) Nukes

ok. send it!

[skillzdadirecta]

21 minutes ago, Iculus said:

Why is this still a thing? Send mi5, SAS, cia, navy seals, Israeli special forces, french counter terrorism division, and whoever fuckall you need to kill this motherfucker. Putin has obviously lost his goddammed mind, and needs to be put down.

This ain't a movie man... or a videogame.

[Iculus]

14 minutes ago, skillzdadirecta said:

This ain't a movie man... or a videogame.

yeah, real women and babies are being murdered in the streets. we are just letting this happen. 

[skillzdadirecta]

1 minute ago, Iculus said:

yeah, real women and babies are being murdered in the streets. we are just letting this happen. 

Then advocate for military intervention and full NATO involvement... not some Mission Impossible/James Bond bullshit. 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[skillzdadirecta]

8 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

Rumor is it's chlorine.

[Comet]

1 hour ago, Iculus said:

Why is this still a thing? Send mi5, SAS, cia, navy seals, Israeli special forces, french counter terrorism division, and whoever fuckall you need to kill this motherfucker. Putin has obviously lost his goddammed mind, and needs to be put down.

Just send in Seth Rogen and James Franco right 

[Uaarkson]

1 hour ago, skillzdadirecta said:

Then advocate for military intervention and full NATO involvement... not some Mission Impossible/James Bond bullshit. 

Explain how this works without millions of casualties 

[skillzdadirecta]

5 minutes ago, Uaarkson said:

Explain how this works without millions of casualties 

I'm not the one advocating for some bullshit spec ops mission out of the movies.

 

9 minutes ago, Comet said:

Just send in Seth Rogen and James Franco right 

EXACTLY. Solid Snake and The Winter Soldier too while you're at it.

[DarkStar189]

I'm really not surprised there is that report of a chemical weapons attack. With the way things have been going for Russia, of course they would escalate it. Do you think there will be more chemical attacks? If so, what can the world really do to stop it? Lately when I think about Russia, it just feels like they are going to do whatever they want because nukes. 

[Iculus]

4 hours ago, skillzdadirecta said:

Then advocate for military intervention and full NATO involvement... not some Mission Impossible/James Bond bullshit. 

There is literally only one person on the planet that wants this war. Fucking kill his goddammed ass.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 11 April 2022 (lengthy):

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Special Edition: Army General Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov US intelligence reported over the weekend of April 9-10 that Russian Army General Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov, commander of the Southern Military District, is now in overall command of

 

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Special Edition: Army General Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov

 

US intelligence reported over the weekend of April 9-10 that Russian Army General Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov, commander of the Southern Military District, is now in overall command of Russian operations in Ukraine. This news is unsurprising; Dvornikov is the most senior of the three Russian military district commanders involved in the invasion, and the Russian military is concentrating its efforts almost exclusively in the area of Ukraine that Dvornikov had already been commanding. Had Putin selected another officer to command the entire war effort, he would likely have had to relieve Dvornikov for these reasons. There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that Dvornikov was specifically selected to take control of the war effort for any particular skills or experience he might have. Nor is there reason to think that the conduct of the Russian war effort will change materially more than it was already changing from the abandonment of the drive on Kyiv and the focus on the east. This update, which we are publishing in addition to our regular military operations assessments, explains Dvornikov’s career history and experience in Syria, the challenges he faces, and what his appointment means for the Russian campaign in Ukraine. 

 

Dvornikov has commanded the Southern Military District since September 2016, capping a military career that began in 1978. He graduated from the Ussuriysk Suvorov Military School—a Soviet military boarding school—at age 18 in 1978.[1] Dvornikov then served as a platoon commander, company commander, and battalion chief of staff in the Far Eastern Military District (the predecessor of Russia’s current Eastern Military District) throughout the 1980s.[2] From 1991 to 1994, Dvornikov served as deputy commander and then commander of a motorized rifle battalion assigned to the Western Group of [Soviet] Forces in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, Dvornikov served as chief of staff and then commander of an unspecified motorized rifle regiment of the Moscow Military District (which merged into the current Western Military District in 2010). He then served as chief of staff and commander of another motorized rifle regiment in the North Caucasian Military District (now part of the Southern Military District) until 2003, during which time he likely participated in the Second Chechen War. From 2005 to 2008 Dvornikov served as a deputy commander and then chief of staff of the 36th Army (part of the current Eastern Military District). Dvornikov commanded the 5th Red Banner Combined Arms Army of the Far Eastern Military District from 2008 to 2010. Dvornikov served as a deputy commander of the Eastern Military District from 2010 to 2012, then as chief of staff of the Central Military District from April 2012 to 2015.

 

Dvornikov commanded Russia’s forces in Syria from the official beginning of the Russian intervention in September 2015 to July 2016.[3] He has commanded the Southern Military District since September 20, 2016.[4] Putin promoted Dvornikov on June 23, 2020, to the rank of army general, the second-highest rank in the Russian military and one not held by any other military district commander.[5] Dvornikov is Russia’s senior-most military district commander, outranking the other two military district commanders involved in the invasion of Ukraine, and a likely candidate (along with the commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army General Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin), to succeed Valery Gerasimov as Russia’s next chief of the general staff. [6]  

 

Dvornikov’s career path is not unusual among senior Russian general officers.[7] Dvornikov’s foundational military experience—like many of his fellow general officers—was his assignment as a regimental chief of staff and then regimental commander in the North Caucasian Military District from 2000 to 2003, during which period he almost certainly participated in the Second Chechen War. Dvornikov’s promotion path from regimental command to Military District Commander was typical. Russian officers usually change military districts with each promotion, as Dvornikov did—moving through the contemporary equivalents of the Southern, Eastern, and Central military districts until taking command of the Southern Military District.[8] Dvornikov’s career path through 2015 was thus unremarkable for a very successful general officer.

 

Dvornikov’s experience commanding the Russian deployment to Syria—and targeting of civilians during that deployment—was also not in itself unique or an indicator of a particular skill set. Many Western media outlets have focused on Dvornikov’s experience in Syria and highlighted Russian targeting of civilians under his command. All of Russia’s current military district commanders, as well as the commanders of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, Airborne forces, and Military-Political Directorate, have served at least one tour of duty in Syria as chief of staff or commander of Russia’s forces in Syria.[9] It appears to have been Russian military policy to rotate senior officers through service in Syria and then select for further promotion only those who had served in Syria.[10] Dvornikov, in fact, has less experience in Syria than many of his contemporaries, serving one 10-month tour as commander. By comparison, Western Military District Commander Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlev and Eastern Military District Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko served in Syria for two tours each, totaling 24 and 20 months respectively.[11] Dvornikov’s command of Russian operations in Syria that killed large numbers of civilians is similarly, and tragically, not unusual. Dvornikov has gained attention in Western media as the “Butcher of Aleppo,” but Russian forces targeted Syrian civilians and critical infrastructure throughout the Russian intervention in Syria, making all Russia’s current military district commanders and many of its senior military leaders complicit in such crimes.[12]

 

Dvornikov’s one unusual skill may result from his particular experience establishing new command structures in complicated coalition settings because he was the first Russian commander in Syria. Dvornikov established Russia’s initial command structure in Syria from the beginning of the Russian intervention in September 2015. Dvornikov has written extensively on the experience of standing up Russian operations in Syria, including a March 2016 retrospective published while he was still serving in Syria and several articles following his return to Russia.[13] He stressed the importance of establishing a unified command and control structure for Russian advisers, the Russian Air Force, and various conventional and unconventional pro-Assad forces. Dvornikov particularly claimed (likely exaggerating) in “Staffs for New Wars” (July 2018) that he rebuilt the shattered and demoralized pro-Syrian forces into a cohesive fighting force. Dvornikov’s writing additionally stresses the importance of creating a unified command structure for all Russian forces cutting across unit and service boundaries. Dvornikov’s Syrian experience may help him integrate the battered elements of the Western, Eastern, and Central military districts coming his way as reinforcements, as well as the Chechen forces of Ramazan Kadyrov and the proxy militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

 

His experience overseeing the pro-Assad offensive that recaptured Aleppo also likely gave him more insight into the conduct of modern urban warfare than his successors in Syria, although urban warfare in Syria was not confined to Aleppo. Dvornikov commanded the final pro-Assad offensive that recaptured Aleppo—Syria’s largest city, with a pre-war population of over 2 million—in 2016. Aleppo was one of the bloodiest campaigns of the Syrian Civil War and likely the main source of recent Russian lessons learned on modern urban combat.[14] But Dvornikov was not specially selected for command because of any experience in urban warfare. To begin with, he took command of the Southern Military District in 2016, likely years before Putin planned to invade and occupy Ukraine. If Putin or Gerasimov were specifically choosing an officer with experience in urban warfare experience to command something, moreover, it would have made much more sense to assign Dvornikov to the battle for Kyiv.  Dvornikov has commanded Russian operations in Mariupol in the current Russian invasion of Ukraine all along. He may have been applying—or attempting to apply—many of the lessons learned in Syria, but his conduct of urban warfare in Mariupol has been unremarkable in terms of its success, speed, and cost in casualties. There is no reason to think that Dvornikov had been selected to command in Syria because of any skill or theoretical work on urban warfare, for that matter. He commanded the Aleppo campaign because it was Russia’s major campaign during his tenure in Syria, not as a specific appointment. The tactics and approaches used by Russian forces in both Syria and Ukraine are not unique to Dvornikov or any other individual Russian commander. Neither are they particularly effective.

 

Dvornikov is the natural choice of military district commander to command current Russian operations in Ukraine due to his command of the primary Russian area of operations and his seniority. Dvornikov’s command of the SMD from 2016 to 2022 grants him the greatest familiarity with operations in eastern Ukraine, as he oversaw the largely frozen conflict in Donbas in that period and is the direct commander of the primary Russian forces in the region—the 8th Combined Arms Army and forces of Russia’s proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Dvornikov has commanded the Donbas and southern axes since the beginning of the current Russian invasion on February 24, and his forces have achieved the greatest successes of the initial period of the war. Had Putin chosen another officer to command the overall war effort now that he has condensed it to a focus on Dvornikov’s area of responsibility he would almost certainly have had to relieve Dvornikov of his command. Considering that Dvornikov’s performance in command was no worse, and in some ways better, than the performances of his lower-ranked colleagues, such a decision would have been odd indeed.

 

The Kremlin’s belated appointment of a single overall commander in Ukraine will not automatically solve Russian command, logistics, and morale issues, and Dvornikov faces several ongoing operations that may exceed his span of control.

 

Russian forces are currently carrying out the following missions in Ukraine:

• Defenses of their positions in Kherson Oblast from Ukrainian counterattacks from the west and north
• Possible advances north from Crimea toward Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro
• The capture of Mariupol
• Frontal assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Offensive operations on the Izyum-Slovyansk axis to encircle Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine (previously led by WMD forces)
• Operations to fix Ukrainian forces in place in Kharkiv (previously led by WMD and CMD forces)
• Efforts to reconstitute damaged and demoralized forces from all four Russian military districts to reinforce two axes, Izyum and Donbas

 

The Russian military’s previous approach to command in the war in Ukraine was apparently for three military district commanders (South, West, and East) to independently command their own axes of advance, leading to disjointed offensive operations. Collapsing the war effort into the east and south itself eliminates some of that problem, whoever took command. Dvornikov’s appointment as sole commander may well challenge his ability to conduct simultaneous operations focused on even this reduced list of Russian offensive operations, especially given the severe losses of senior commanders the Russian military has experienced. We have already seen indicators that Russian forces are unable to conduct simultaneous major offensive operations between Kherson, Donbas, and Izyum, and this challenge will likely continue.

 

Dvornikov will likely struggle to integrate units redeployed from western to eastern Ukraine into his ongoing operations, which have to date been conducted by Southern Military District troops under his direct command. ISW has assessed throughout the war that the SMD had been the most effective Russian district due to its unity of command, high readiness, and rate of large-echelon military exercises prior to the war—in contrast to units from Russia’s other districts, which were cobbled together prior to the invasion with little time to cohere unified structures and practice the high-end conventional warfare necessary for the current Russian campaign.[15] Damaged Russian units withdrawn from Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine continue to deploy to the Izyum axis and may eventually redeploy to Donbas. These units are unlikely to perform better just because Dvornikov is leading them as overall commander.  Dvornikov will in fact likely face significant challenges integrating these units into ongoing operations.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian Commander of the Southern Military District Army General Alexander Dvornikov is the natural choice to take overall command of Russian operations in Ukraine. There is no reason to suppose Dvornikov was selected for any particular skills or experience, nor is there reason to think the conduct of the Russian war effort will materially change more than it was already changing due to the Russian abandonment of northeastern Ukraine and focus on the east.
• Russian forces may have used chemical weapons against Ukrainian defenders in Mariupol, though ISW cannot independently verify Ukrainian claims at this time.
• Russian forces failed to make significant advances in continued assaults on Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Rubizhne in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued to amass troops in Kharkiv Oblast to reinforce offensive operations on the Izyum axis and conducted several minor attacks.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Zaku3]

16 hours ago, Uaarkson said:

Explain how this works without millions of casualties 

 

It doesn't but a black ops to assassinate putin is 99% likely to fail and trigger WW3 anyway. 

 

@DarkStar189 This situation shows that having nukes make you untouchable.

[MarSolo]

18 hours ago, skillzdadirecta said:

I'm not the one advocating for some bullshit spec ops mission out of the movies.

 

EXACTLY. Solid Snake and The Winter Soldier too while you're at it.

Christ, it’s like you don’t know ANYTHING. Who do you think the Winter Soldier works for???

[Jason]

18 minutes ago, MarSolo said:

Christ, it’s like you don’t know ANYTHING. Who do you think the Winter Soldier works for???

 

Old Man Christmas? 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Jason]

11 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

Is he "Putin's best friend, who's in Ukraine" or "Putin's best Ukrainian friend"?

[CitizenVectron]

Just now, Jason said:

 

Is he "Putin's best friend, who's in Ukraine" or "Putin's best Ukrainian friend"?

 

The latter. There were rumours that he was a potential patsy President if Kyiv fell.

[Link200]

17 hours ago, Iculus said:

There is literally only one person on the planet that wants this war. Fucking kill his goddammed ass.

Easier said than done. Not to mention that Putin is not the only high ranking person in Russia that wants this war. The only way Putin gets removed any time soon would be via an internal movement.

[PaladinSolo]