Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (27 June 2024) - US/Israel in talks to supply 8 Patriot systems to Ukraine

[Air_Delivery]

 

[Air_Delivery]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Who would have imagined that five weeks into the war, Ukraine's air force would not only still be intact, but that they would be performing strikes inside Russia?!

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

I don't know...this would be an incredibly damaging false flag, that was a giant oil facility. More likely that a local Ukranian air base decided to take measures into their own hands.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Jesus fuck

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 31 March 2022
 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces conducted several local counterattacks around Kyiv, in northeastern Ukraine, and toward Kherson on March 31, successfully pressuring Russian forces and seeking to disrupt ongoing Russian troop rotations. Ukrainian forces northwest of

 

 

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Ukrainian forces conducted several local counterattacks around Kyiv, in northeastern Ukraine, and toward Kherson on March 31, successfully pressuring Russian forces and seeking to disrupt ongoing Russian troop rotations. Ukrainian forces northwest of Kyiv pushed Russian forces north of the E-40 highway and will likely assault Russian-held Bucha and Hostomel in the coming days. Ukrainian forces exploited limited Russian withdrawals east of Brovary to retake territory across Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts. Ukrainian forces likely conducted counterattacks toward Sumy in the past 24 hours as well, though ISW cannot independently confirm these reports. Finally, Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks in northern Kherson Oblast. Russian forces only conducted offensive operations in Donbas and against Mariupol in the last 24 hours and did not make any major advances.

 

Russian efforts to redeploy damaged units from the Kyiv and Sumy axes to eastern Ukraine are unlikely to enable Russian forces to conduct major gains. Russia continued to withdraw elements of the 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies and 76 Air Assault Division from their positions northwest of Kyiv into Belarus for refit and likely further redeployment to eastern Ukraine. However, these units are likely heavily damaged and demoralized. Feeding damaged Eastern Military District units directly into operations in eastern Ukraine—predominantly conducted by the Southern Military District—will likely prove ineffective and additionally introduce further command-and-control challenges for the Russian military. Russian forces will likely attempt to retain their current front lines around Kyiv and in northeastern Ukraine and will continue to dig in on these fronts; ISW has not seen any indicators of Russian forces fully relinquishing captured territory. However, Ukrainian counterattacks are likely disrupting Russian efforts to redeploy and refit their forces and will continue in the coming days.

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces successfully conducted local counterattacks around Kyiv, towards Sumy, and in Kherson Oblast and will likely take further territory—particularly northwest and east of Kyiv—in the coming days.
• Russia is withdrawing elements of its damaged forces around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy for redeployment to eastern Ukraine, but these units are unlikely to provide a decisive shift in Russian combat power.
• Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian assaults throughout Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, and Russian forces failed to take territory in the past 24 hours.
• Russian forces continue to steadily advance in Mariupol.
• Russia’s preplanned spring draft will begin on April 1 and does not appear abnormal from Russia’s typical conscription cycle. Newly drafted conscripts will not provide Russia with additional combat power for many months.
• The Kremlin is likely accelerating efforts to establish quasi-state entities to govern occupied Ukrainian territory.

 

Putin signed a decree on March 31 beginning Russia’s preplanned spring draft, conscripting 134,500 Russians.[1]  Russia conducts two prescheduled drafts a year, typically running from April 1 to July 15 and October 1 to December 31.[2] The number of Russian conscripts called up is relatively consistent, including 127,000 in fall 2021 and 134,000 in Spring 2021.[3] New conscripts typically undergo one or two months of basic training followed by three to sixth months of advanced training prior to assignment to specific units, and are precluded by law from deploying to combat with less than four months of training—though the Kremlin could bypass this restriction by announcing a general mobilization.[4] Russia’s Spring 2022 draft does not as of yet appear abnormal from Russia’s typical conscription cycle, but ISW will closely monitor any developments throughout the April 1-July 15 call-up period. Newly drafted conscripts will not provide Russia additional combat power for many months.

 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 31 that 200 “mercenaries from the Middle East,” likely Syrian troops, arrived at the Gomel military airfield in Belarus on March 29.[5] ISW published an assessment of Russia’s mobilization of reinforcements from Syria and elsewhere to Ukraine earlier on March 31.[6]

 

The Kremlin is likely accelerating efforts to establish quasi-state entities to govern occupied Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 30 that Russia is attempting to set up military-civilian administrations and is preparing to create a “Kherson’s Peoples Republic” to administer occupied southern Ukraine. The General Staff later reported on March 31 that Russia's FSB, the 652nd Group of Information and Psychological Operations, and officers of the 12th Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation are currently overseeing the occupation around Kherson, and the Kremlin is “curating” Russian law enforcement personnel and court officials for deployment to Ukraine at an unspecified future date.

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW discusses the "risks" of a Russian ceasefire offer:

 

The Risks of a Russian Ceasefire Offer | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine may soon face a new threat in this war—Russia’s ceasefire offer. It seems odd to say that a ceasefire is a threat. Once war begins, the default position in the West is to seize the earliest opportunity to “stop the fighting.” But while some ceasef

 

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Ukraine may soon face a new threat in this war—Russia’s ceasefire offer. It seems odd to say that a ceasefire is a threat. Once war begins, the default position in the West is to seize the earliest opportunity to “stop the fighting.” But while some ceasefires lead to peace, others lead to more war—as the Russians have repeatedly shown. The frontlines frozen in a ceasefire set the conditions for the negotiations and reconstruction that follow. They also set conditions for future conflict. Those seeking enduring peace in Ukraine must resist the temptation to accept a Russian ceasefire offer that sets conditions for renewed conflict on Russia’s terms or gives Russia leverage on Ukraine with which to force concessions and surrenders.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's intelligence briefing for Days 35-36

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

Russia pulling out of the north is a double-edged sword for them. Yes, it allows them to eventually redeploy those forces in the east and south, but it will also free up Ukrainian (battle-hardened) forces to the east and south. And while Russia has done well in the south (specifically Kherson oblast), they haven't done that well in the east.

 

It's entirely possible that Ukraine will manage to push the Russian's back to the 2018 borders everywhere except Kherson. 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

The Battle of Kyiv is over, with a decisive Ukrainian victory:

 

 

[ThreePi]

2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Jesus fuck

 

 

 

At least get like a long stick or something. Push them around like a shuffleboard puck.

[CitizenVectron]

Apparently the Russians left behind a tonne of heavy equipment because they simply didn't have the fuel to move them when they pulled out:

 

 

[Link200]

2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Russia is blaming it on Ukraine. I'm not exactly sure how Russia could spin this one in their favor. Either direction they take is bad for them considering all the propaganda they have been feeding their people.

[Jason]

4 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Jesus fuck

 

 

 

massive brass balls

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

Gif of the past week:

 

 

[Zaku3]

Just now, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

Another country that needs "denazification".

[CitizenVectron]

With Borodyanka confirmed as retaken, that means any remaining Russia forces NW of Kyiv are now encircled. It's likely the vast majority made it out, however.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

From the sounds of it, the Ukrainians expected the Russians to pull back from Kyiv but to do so in an organized fashion under a rolling retreat, and to then entrench themselves to keep Ukrainian forces occupied in the area (and unable to aid Donbas/JTO). Instead, perhaps spurred by Ukraine's attempt to encircle them, it turned into a rout, with a huge amount of Russian gear either abandoned or destroyed. Basically the troops moving back from the front may have caused panic, and the entire region of Russian forces fled back towards Belarus.

[PaladinSolo]

1 minute ago, CitizenVectron said:

From the sounds of it, the Ukrainians expected the Russians to pull back from Kyiv but to do so in an organized fashion under a rolling retreat, and to then entrench themselves to keep Ukrainian forces occupied in the area (and unable to aid Donbas/JTO). Instead, perhaps spurred by Ukraine's attempt to encircle them, it turned into a rout, with a huge amount of Russian gear either abandoned or destroyed. Basically the troops moving back from the front may have caused panic, and the entire region of Russian forces fled back towards Belarus.

They've apparently left a lot of their dead just lying in the streets, plenty of videos out there, they got wrekt.

[Guest]

Is Ukraine “winning” in the macro view of the war? It is obvious that it isn’t going as Russia expected, but how bad is this at the current moment?

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

4 minutes ago, sblfilms said:

Is Ukraine “winning” in the macro view of the war? It is obvious that it isn’t going as Russia expected, but how bad is this at the current moment?

 

For sure we can say that Russia is losing...but I wouldn't say Ukraine is winning. 

 

Russia's goals (in order of what they want) are likely something like:

• All of Ukraine (what Putin wants in a perfect world)
• All of Donbas + All of Kherson, and the land between (their primary victory condition)
• Kherson (to Mariupol) and retain the parts of Donbas they have (the best they can hope for)

Ukraine's goals (same rules):

• All of Ukraine back, including Crimea (not likely)
• All of Ukraine back excluding Crimea (their primary victory condition)
• Losing the rest of Donbas and Kherson, but retaining the rest of Ukraine (defeat, but still a nation)

At this point I don't see how Russia can actually take more of Donbas, especially if Ukraine is able to now reinforce the east. In fact, the region (Donbas) that was the ostensible reason for this war is the area the Russians have done the worst in. The Russians have done better in the south, and that area will be hard for Ukraine to retake.

 

Momentum is definitely on Ukraine's side, but long-term Russia can still produce more weapons (though it will take a long time). Ukraine needs to press the advantage before the west inevitably gets bored of the conflict.

[mclumber1]

18 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

For sure we can say that Russia is losing...but I wouldn't say Ukraine is winning. 

 

Russia's goals (in order of what they want) are likely something like:

• All of Ukraine (what Putin wants in a perfect world)
• All of Donbas + All of Kherson, and the land between (their primary victory condition)
• Kherson (to Mariupol) and retain the parts of Donbas they have (the best they can hope for)

Ukraine's goals (same rules):

• All of Ukraine back, including Crimea (not likely)
• All of Ukraine back excluding Crimea (their primary victory condition)
• Losing the rest of Donbas and Kherson, but retaining the rest of Ukraine (defeat, but still a nation)

At this point I don't see how Russia can actually take more of Donbas, especially if Ukraine is able to now reinforce the east. In fact, the region (Donbas) that was the ostensible reason for this war is the area the Russians have done the worst in. The Russians have done better in the south, and that area will be hard for Ukraine to retake.

 

Momentum is definitely on Ukraine's side, but long-term Russia can still produce more weapons (though it will take a long time). Ukraine needs to press the advantage before the west inevitably gets bored of the conflict.

 

Assuming the Russian people stand for it, Russia can just continue to throw conscripts into the meatgrinder too.  Bodies upon bodies is one of the reasons they were able to ultimately defeat Germany in World War 2 (along with massive support from the US and the allies).

[CitizenVectron]

4 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

 

Assuming the Russian people stand for it, Russia can just continue to throw conscripts into the meatgrinder too.  Bodies upon bodies is one of the reasons they were able to ultimately defeat Germany in World War 2 (along with massive support from the US and the allies).

 

I don't know if that tactic really works as well as it did. The age of mass formations/men on foot is over, as is the age of main battle tank assaults. I don't think lines on lines of rifle-holding conscripts is a great invasion force, especially when it's easier to break soldiers with drone strikes, shelling, etc.

 

While Russia does have a numerical advantage in population (though only about 3:1), it's not easy to invade a place and hold it, especially when the defenders are battle-hardened.

[PaladinSolo]

6 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

 

Assuming the Russian people stand for it, Russia can just continue to throw conscripts into the meatgrinder too.  Bodies upon bodies is one of the reasons they were able to ultimately defeat Germany in World War 2 (along with massive support from the US and the allies).

Bodies can't win you a war anymore, and had they not received tens of thousands of trucks from the US they would have failed back then too.  

[CitizenVectron]

lmao