mclumber1 Posted July 30, 2023 Share Posted July 30, 2023 3 hours ago, TUFKAK said: Nationalize it The problem is that Starlink requires continuous launches of new satellites because the system isn't fully built-out yet, there is a failure rate of deployed satellites, and the lifetime of any given satellite is only about 5 years, at which point they intentionally deorbit the satellite. Sure, I suppose you could nationalize the Starlink constellation, but who is going to launch it? The easiest and most straightforward thing the government can do is what it is doing: Procure and pay for Starlink terminals that are not geolocked. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jason Posted July 31, 2023 Share Posted July 31, 2023 Trump calls for conditioning Ukraine aid on congressional Biden probes https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/07/29/trump-ukraine-congress-hunter-biden/ Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TUFKAK Posted July 31, 2023 Share Posted July 31, 2023 Just have an AAA damn. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted July 31, 2023 Author Share Posted July 31, 2023 Some evidence that Ukraine is using brand-new Iranian shells (produced 2023) against Russia. No clue how they got them, or under what deal. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted July 31, 2023 Share Posted July 31, 2023 ISW analysis for 30 July 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 30, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. The Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on July 29 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Chonhar bridge on the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast.[1] ISW has not observed any Russian milblogger discussion about the Ukrainian strike or Russian milbloggers promoting Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo’s claim that Russian forces intercepted 12 Ukrainian Strom Shadow cruise missiles targeting the bridge.[2] The only other Russian source to comment on the strikes was a local Russian news Telegram channel, which amplified alleged claims from Russian tourists in the area about the bridge being closed to traffic.[3] Russian milbloggers responded to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge on June 22 with widespread outrage and concern, and Russian milbloggers routinely comment on both successful and allegedly unsuccessful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[4] The Chonhar bridge is a notable bottleneck along a critical Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), and it is highly unlikely that Russian milbloggers would voluntarily ignore a successful or unsuccessful Ukrainian strike on the bridge. ISW has previously assessed that select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their coverage of the war in Ukraine in ways more favorable to Kremlin narratives out of fear of Kremlin punishment following the removal of prominent critical voices in the Russian information space, particularly pro-war critic Igor Girkin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[5] General fear of Kremlin punishment would not likely result in such near-universal lack of coverage of a dramatic event, however, and it is more likely that a specific Kremlin directive not to cover disruptions to critical GLOCs caused this lack of reporting. Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. During a press conference at the Russia-Africa Summit on July 29, Putin accused Ukraine of launching a large-scale offensive so that Russia cannot discuss a ceasefire while its troops are defending against Ukrainian attacks.[6] Russian officials have previously weaponized the mention of negotiations in order to accuse Ukraine of being the party unwilling to enter into negotiations discussions, and Putin is likely using discussions of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to undermine reports of Ukrainian battlefield successes and accuse Ukraine of continued lack of interest in a potential negotiations process.[7] Russian forces have been conducting their own attacks in Luhansk and around Donetsk City almost continuously since before the Ukrainian counter-offensive began, moreover, a fact that Putin did not, naturally, mention. Putin also notably lauded the work of Central Military district Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev for repelling Ukrainian attacks and securing advances, likely in Luhansk Oblast.[8] Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces are achieving small successes on the southern flank of Bakhmut and are gradually advancing in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (in western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9] Key Takeaways: The lack of Russian milblogger reaction to a Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar bridge represents a notable inflection in Russian reporting on the war in Ukraine and may suggest that the Kremlin has directed Russian milbloggers to refrain from covering certain topics. Russian President Vladimir Putin disingenuously framed the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive as inhibiting prospects for negotiations. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and made claimed advances in some areas. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kremina and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and did not make any confirmed gains in these areas. Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations southwest and northwest of Bakhmut and made claimed gains in this direction. Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made claimed marginal advances. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and regained lost positions in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian sources claimed that Russian officials plan to regulate civilian volunteers who take supplies to Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged Russian military equipment in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on July 29. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PaladinSolo Posted July 31, 2023 Share Posted July 31, 2023 4 hours ago, CitizenVectron said: Some evidence that Ukraine is using brand-new Iranian shells (produced 2023) against Russia. No clue how they got them, or under what deal. Iran and the US are working on a new nuclear deal, so possibly some cooling going on and aiding Ukraine to further that along. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 1, 2023 Author Share Posted August 1, 2023 So as you may recall, last night Ukraine hit a government tower in Moscow with a UAV. Russia reported that it was just the debris of an intercepted drone. So tonight...Ukraine hit the same building again on a different floor. 2 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Nokra Posted August 1, 2023 Share Posted August 1, 2023 3 hours ago, CitizenVectron said: So as you may recall, last night Ukraine hit a government tower in Moscow with a UAV. Russia reported that it was just the debris of an intercepted drone. So tonight...Ukraine hit the same building again on a different floor. That's one unlucky building! Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 1, 2023 Author Share Posted August 1, 2023 Nice. I've seen it in-person, it's a really cool monument: 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 1, 2023 Share Posted August 1, 2023 ISW analysis for 31 July 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that Wagner personnel conducted company-level training with unspecified elements of m Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 30 that Wagner personnel conducted company-level training with unspecified elements of multiple Belarusian mechanized brigades.[1] The training included tactical maneuver for dismounted infantry and focused on force concealment from enemy UAVs and coordination between companies, platoons, and squads.[2] The training also reportedly featured Belarusian infantry conducting a combined arms assault with tank and artillery support.[3] The Wagner Group’s new role in Belarusian company-level training is notable. The Belarusian military typically conducts such exercises with Russian trainers and relies on Russian planners for any multi-brigade exercises, which ISW has not yet observed Wagner Group participating in. ISW previously observed Wagner personnel training with a Belarusian airborne brigade that historically trains with the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and forecasted that the Wagner Group may seek to supplant legacy Russian–Belarusian unit relationships.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin reportedly ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5. Prigozhin announced on July 30 that “unfortunately a few [Wagner personnel] agreed to transfer from the Wagner Group” and joined other unspecified Russian security services — likely the Russian MoD).[5] Prigozhin thanked former Wagner personnel for their service, stated that neither he nor Wagner’s Council of Commanders banned Wagner personnel from joining different Russian “security structures,” and expressed hope that the departed Wagner members would “keep in touch” so that they can rejoin Wagner should there ever arrive a time when the Wagner Group must reform a force.[6] Prigozhin also reiterated known details about how the Wagner Group will continue to train Belarusian forces and operate in Africa.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also noted on July 31 that Prigozhin ordered all Wagner personnel currently on rest and recuperation to arrive at Wagner’s field camps in Belarus no later than August 5 to attend unspecified events that Prigozhin will personally lead on August 5.[8] Prigozhin stated that most Wagner fighters are on “vacation” as of July 30.[9] Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves. Prigozhin stated on July 30 that Wagner has sufficient personnel and does not plan to conduct another recruitment drive until it needs more fighters.[10] A Wagner recruitment Telegram page announced on July 30 that Wagner is indefinitely suspending regional recruitment centers in Russia due to Wagner having sufficient reserves.[11] The exact reason the Wagner Group suspended recruitment is unclear, however. The Wagner Group was reportedly still recruiting fighters from across Russia as of early July 2023.[12] The Kremlin may have recently banned the Wagner Group from recruiting within Russia, and Prigozhin may simply be attempting to save face by claiming he voluntarily suspended recruitment efforts. ISW cannot independently confirm the Wagner Group’s current strength or depth of reserves. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation.[13] Shoigu claimed that over 15,000 students enrolled at Russian military universities for the coming school year, 10 percent of whom have combat experience fighting in Ukraine. Shoigu announced the resumption of instruction at the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in occupied Donetsk, one of the combined arms academies the Russian military requires officers to attend before commanding at the brigade or regiment level. Shoigu also reiterated positive rhetoric about the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and actively seeking international military-technical cooperation to support the war effort. Shoigu stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will sign contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (roughly $4.7 billion) with defense enterprises at the Army-2023 international military-technical forum. The claimed overall value of these contracts is at least 13.4 percent less than the over 500 billion ruble (roughly $5.45 billion) value of contracts the MoD signed at the Army-2022 and 2021 forums but a substantial increase over the 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016 forums, the overall contract values of which were roughly 1.16 trillion rubles ($17.4 billion), 1.03 trillion ($10.9 billion), 130 billion ($1.4 billion), 170 billion ($1.8 billion), and 130 billion, respectively.[14] Shoigu stated that Russia invited the heads of over 108 defense departments to attend the Army-2023 forum.[15] Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Satellite imagery posted on July 30 reportedly shows damage to the Chonhar railway bridge.[16] Social media sources additionally circulated an image taken by someone standing on the bridge itself reportedly showing damage to the railway bridge.[17] One source speculated that the pictures taken from the bridge do not match the location of the damage as shown on available satellite imagery, which suggests that the full extent of the damage to the bridge is still unclear.[18] Russian milbloggers maintained their silence on damage to the Chonhar Bridge on July 31, possibly supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin may have directed Russian commentators to refrain from covering the strike in an effort to exert greater control of the information space.[19] Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war.[20] In a report on the activities “authorized by the President of the Russian Federation for children’s rights” in 2022, Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has “received” 4.8 million Ukrainians since February 2022 and noted that the vast majority of the 700,000 children who arrived to Russia did not have parental or guardian supervision.[21] The report carefully frames these activities as humanitarian gestures of goodwill. International humanitarian law, however, defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation.” And the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation in occupied territories are likely sufficiently coercive to mean that most “transfers” of Ukrainian civilians to Russia meet the threshold of forced deportation, which is prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regardless of Russia’s claimed motive.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to the Russian Federation.[23] Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking northwest and southwest of Bakhmut, in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces liberated an additional 2 square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area and 12.6 square kilometers in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[25] Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin arrived in Iran on July 31 and met with his counterpart, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and a bilateral military cooperation plan for 2023.[26] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for negotiating military acquisitions and sales in his role as Iranian Defense Minister, so Khrenin and Ashtiani likely discussed arms deals during their meeting. Belarus may have also been seeking to secure an agreement on Iranian production of Shahed drones on the territory of Belarus following initial reports that Iran was seeking to convert a plant in Belarus’ Gomel Oblast into a Shahed production plant.[27] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13. Yermak stated that the security guarantees for Ukraine — including “concrete and long-term commitments that will ensure Ukraine's ability to win now and deter Russian aggression in the future” — will cover the period before Ukraine acquires NATO membership.[28] Yermak described the security guarantees as an “important prerequisite” for Ukraine’s recovery and noted that the security guarantees include financial support for Ukraine and sanctions and punitive measures against Russia.[29] Key Takeaways: The Wagner Group may be supplanting the Russian military as the Belarusian military’s key training partner. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely succeeded in recruiting an unknown number of Wagner personnel following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion, though Prigozhin ordered remaining Wagner fighters to assemble in Belarus by August 5. Prigozhin stated that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting in Russia and claimed that the Wagner Group does not need to recruit more personnel and has sufficient reserves. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian state as adequately supporting long-term force-generation efforts and meeting Russian weapons demand through domestic production and international cooperation. Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war, very likely violating the Fourth Geneva Convention. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 31. Iran and Belarus are deepening bilateral cooperation over the backdrop of their mutual support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine “security guarantees” as soon as the week of August 6 – 13. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka-Donetsk City lines and made claimed gains in Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law on July 31 increasing the fine for mobilized personnel’s or conscripts' failure to arrive at a military registration office after being summoned. 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Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 2, 2023 Share Posted August 2, 2023 ISW analysis for 01 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 1, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1. The Russian MoD initially claimed that Ukraine launched three unmanned boats at the “Sergey Kotov” Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1. The Russian MoD initially claimed that Ukraine launched three unmanned boats at the “Sergey Kotov” and “Vasily Bykov” Project 22160 large patrol ships in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, about 340km southwest of Sevastopol.[1] The Russian MoD later clarified that the patrol ships were escorting Russian civilian transport ships en route to the Bosphorus Strait via the Black Sea and claimed that the patrol ships detected and destroyed all three semi-submersibles.[2] Russian authorities may be amplifying claims of Ukrainian attacks to frame Ukraine as irresponsibly threatening civilian ships in the Black Sea, thereby setting conditions to further escalate naval activity and consolidate control in the Black Sea, though there is no indication that Ukrainian attacks on Russian military targets have threatened civilian vessels.[3] Geolocated images posted on July 31 show the installation of anti-naval drone barriers in Sevastopol Bay, likely as part of the overall Russian effort to increase naval and defensive posturing in the Black Sea.[4] Ukrainian actors likely conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1. Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin claimed that Russian air defense downed several drones flying towards Moscow, and geolocated footage shows that one drone struck the 21st floor of the IQ-Kvartal Tower in central Moscow City.[5] Russian media reported that the target of the strike was the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, located on the IQ-Kvartal Tower’s 21st floor.[6] Russian sources claimed that drones previously struck the IQ-Kvartal Tower on the night of July 29 to 30.[7] Social media footage from August 1 additionally shows a drone flying over Moscow suburbs in the Odintsovo district.[8] Several sources suggested that the drones were Ukrainian-made.[9] One Russian commentator accused Sobyanin of neglecting to secure Moscow against such continued drone attacks.[10] Russian authorities will likely struggle to balance the need to quell domestic concern over continuing drone attacks deep within the Russian rear with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society for the war and its corresponding consequences. The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage of Gerasimov on August 1 reportedly inspecting a forward command post in western Zaporizhia Oblast and receiving a briefing on Ukrainian operations and Russian defenses in the area.[11] This footage is one of Gerasimov’s first public appearances since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion and indicates that the MoD continues to publicize Gerasimov’s role as theater commander.[12] Some Russian sources previously claimed that rumored deputy theater commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Gerasimov as overall theater commander in Ukraine following Wagner’s rebellion, but ISW was unable to verify these rumors and assessed that Gerasimov will likely nominally retain his position in the Russian military.[13] The MoD’s footage notably portrays Gerasimov as the architect of Russian defensive operations in one sector of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south, a role that the Russian information space previously attributed to both former deputy commander of the joint grouping of forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin and former 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov prior to their likely dismissals on June 28 and July 15, respectively, for challenging Gerasimov and the traditional MoD hierarchy.[14] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.” Lukashenko stated on August 1 that he seeks to retain the Wagner Group within the Belarusian Armed Forces by using experienced Wagner fighters to “more actively create a contract army.”[15] Lukashenko did not provide details on the “contract army’s” organizational structure, planned end strength, or formation timeline, but noted that the Wagner Group currently includes over 30,000 fighters.[16] Belarus currently does not have a “contract army” or a structure resembling a “contract army,” which in this context likely refers to the Russian term of “kontraktniki,” professional volunteer soldiers rather than conscripts. The Belarusian military does not field any formations above the brigade level and Belarus’ main combat units are six separate brigades (three mechanized, two airborne, and one spetsnaz) primarily staffed by 18-month conscripts and some contract servicemen.[17] The creation of a “contract army” would likely require the creation of a new formation or a significant reorganization of Belarus’ existing brigades and an overhaul of Belarusian training to create a force of long-serving professional soldiers, as Russia previously (and unsuccessfully) attempted to do in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Then-Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov previously stated in 2016 that Belarus should not and does not plan to transition away from the traditional staff and cadre system to have a fully contract army.[18] Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1. Polish officials reported that two Belarusian helicopters entered Polish airspace on August 1 and that Poland will increase its troop presence at the Polish-Belarusian border in response.[19] Lukashenko also dismissed the Polish government for overreacting to news that the Wagner Group deployed a 100-person element closer to the Belarusian-Polish border and claimed that Wagner forces are in Grodno and Brest, rather than near the international border.[20] ISW continues to assess that Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland (or Ukraine, for that matter) until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued gradually advancing near Bakhmut, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces captured an unspecified height south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[21] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on August 1 that in the past week, Ukrainian forces captured two square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut direction and 12 square kilometers in southern Ukraine.[22] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks against Russian forces along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne.[23] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) in western Zaporizhia Oblast likely struggles with severe fatigue and that elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) south of Velyka Novosilka likely face a high level of pressure to defend the area and feel that the Russian military command should rotate them from the front line.[24] The UK MoD also reported that Russian commanders in southern Ukraine largely struggle with artillery ammunition shortages, a lack of reserves, and challenges with securing the flanks of defending units. Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported that unsanctioned Russian companies Rusal, Novatek, PIK, and Mospromstroy that are affiliated with Russian oligarchs, including Oleg Deripaska, Leonid Mikhelson, Sergei Gordeev, and Mikhail Gutseriev, recruit Russian volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine.[25] Vazhnye Istorii reported that both the Russian MoD and Russian “military industrial complex companies” pay recruits’ salaries, who then serve in the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) and the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th Air Assault Regiment (7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division).[26] ISW and Vazhnye Istorii previously reported that Russian state-owned companies such as Gazprom, Russian Railways, and Roscosmos have contributed to recruitment efforts.[27] Gazprom and Russian Railways are under Western sanctions, however.[28] Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s August 1 Iran Update) Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri called for greater defense industry cooperation between Iran and Belarus during a meeting with Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin in Tehran on August 1.[29] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani signed a military cooperation agreement with Khrenin on July 31.[30] CTP assessed that Ashtiani and Khrenin may have discussed establishing Shahed kamikaze drone factories in Belarus to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[31] Ukraine claimed in May 2023 that Iranian engineers are exploring how to convert factories in Gomel, Belarus into drone production facilities.[32] The Biden administration revealed in June that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, Russia.[33] Iran opened an Ababil-2 drone factory in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in May 2022. Bagheri notably attended the opening ceremony of this factory.[34] The production of Iranian drones in Belarus and Russia will benefit both Russia and Iran: Russia will benefit by acquiring Iranian drones for its invasion of Ukraine more readily. Israeli and Ukrainian media have noted that the construction of an Iranian drone factory in Belarus would alleviate the “logistical problems” Russia faces in transporting Iranian drones from Iran to Russia via the Middle East.[35] The Biden administration published a map in June showing Iranian drone transfers from Iran to Russia through the Caspian Sea.[36] Iran will benefit by receiving revenue for the Iranian economy. The British Secret Intelligence Service revealed in July that Iran seeks to acquire cash from Russia in return for Iranian drones.[37] Iran is currently facing critical economic conditions, with the value of the rial surpassing 500,000 rials to one US dollar on August 1.[38] The Iran Statistical Center reported on July 25 that Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 47.5 percent.[39] Russia can also benefit Iran's military. Western media speculated in late 2022 that Iran might receive Russian Su-35 fighter jets in return for supplying Russia with drones.[40] Iranian military officials have increasingly expressed skepticism at receiving Su-35s in recent months, however.[41] Western media reported in March that Russia provided Iran with advanced surveillance software and cyber weapons in exchange for drones.[42] A high-ranking Israeli military official separately expressed concern in June that Russia is providing Iran with Western weapons captured in Ukraine.[43] Iran’s close cooperation with Belarus and Russia may stem, in part, because Iran has signed long-term strategic agreements with these countries. The graphic below depicts which countries Iran has signed or is pursuing cooperation agreements with. Quote Key Takeaways: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of attempting to attack two Black Sea Fleet patrol boats with unmanned semi-submersibles on August 1. Likely Ukrainian actors conducted another drone strike on Moscow City in the early hours of August 1. The Russian MoD continues to posture Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov as an effective and involved overall theater commander in Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may have signaled his intent to use the Wagner Group to create a foundation for an unspecified Belarusian “contract army.” Two Belarusian helicopters reportedly violated Polish airspace on August 1. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 1. Russian companies not under Western sanctions continue to recruit volunteers to fight in the war in Ukraine. Iran is pursuing the construction of drone factories in Belarus and Russia, which will help Russia acquire Iranian drones more readily and provide Iran with numerous economic and military benefits. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 1 and made advances in certain areas. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 1 and advanced near Kreminna and Bakhmut. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers granted Russian volunteer fighters and Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) militia fighters (opolcheniye) veteran status on August 1. Russian occupation authorities continue to deport children from occupied regions of Ukraine to Russia under the guise of education and rehabilitation programs. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 3, 2023 Author Share Posted August 3, 2023 A Drawn-Out Ukraine War Opens New Risks for China WWW.WSJ.COM Beijing’s expected attendance at peace meeting could show any evolution in its viewpoint Quote "China is changing its view of the war in Ukraine and will join the negotiations in Saudi Arabia" While it's good in theory that China is moving towards the "the war should end" camp, I would bet $100 that any negotiations involving them (and SA) will pretty much just be "Russia will agree to stop the current hostilities, but they get to keep what they have now, and they can continue to mass forces around the border...but promise not to invade again." In other words, not acceptable. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 3, 2023 Share Posted August 3, 2023 ISW analysis for 02 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 2, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the m Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the milblogger community. A pro-war milblogger accused other prominent pro-war milbloggers who have been critical of the Russian conduct of the war on August 2 of being “imbeciles” who support “provocative publications” and the “frantic criticism of the [Russian Ministry of Defense]” because the milbloggers posted images reportedly showing the aftermath of recent Ukrainian strikes near Sevastopol and on the Chonhar Bridge, which some sources suggested would irresponsibly spread panic.[1] A notorious Kremlin-backed pro-Russian Ukrainian blogger additionally accused one of the critical milbloggers under attack of stealing crowdsourced collection funds meant for Russian forces.[2] Both these specific critiques drew significant attention from other pro-war Russian commentators, many of whom supported the critical channels being attacked for reporting on the Crimea strikes.[3] One milblogger noted that the crux of the issue lies with the fact that these two channels post pictures of purported Ukrainian strikes on Crimea but emphasized that the original images came from Ukrainian Telegram channels.[4] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the dispute over posting images of strikes in Crimea became so intense that it attracted the attention of the Crimean Federal Security Service (FSB) branch and Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov, likely because these entities are interested in preventing panic in Crimea.[5] The dispute over these two milbloggers, alongside the accompanying allegations, suggests that the issue of strikes against Crimea is a distinctly neuralgic point in the pro-war Russian information space. ISW previously noted that following an apparent Ukrainian strike on the Chonhar Bridge on July 29 the vast majority of Russian milbloggers stayed silent with a few select channels simply reposting imagery of the resulting damage in the days that followed.[6] ISW assessed that the lack of milblogger discussion following the Chonhar strike suggests that the Kremlin may have formally directed milbloggers not to cover it.[7] The criticism of the two critical milboggers’ coverage of the Crimean strikes further supports ISW’s previous assessment and underlines the fact that coverage of events in Crimea has created substantial tension in the Russian information space. Russian authorities, including the Crimean occupation administration, have a vested interest in restricting the dissemination of information about the strikes and their implications for Russian logistics through the occupied peninsula due to concerns that this information will cause panic in the population and call into question Russia’s ability to effectively secure its occupied territory. The highest echelons of the Russian military command may have directed milbloggers to stay silent about problems that can be directly blamed on the Russian military command. Russian milbloggers’ very muted reactions to recent strikes against Crimea contrast sharply with their reactions to recent drone strikes against Moscow. Milbloggers have been relatively vocal in responding to Ukrainian drone strikes on Moscow City in recent days, with some Russian sources directly blaming Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin for the strikes due to his administration’s failures to secure Moscow’s air space.[8] The defense of Russian positions in Crimea, by contrast, is clearly the responsibility of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, who is also the overall theater commander in Ukraine. Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for the security of Moscow as well, but he has neither portrayed himself nor been portrayed as directly involved in defending the capital’s airspace whereas he, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and the Russian military high command in general have made much of their control over the war in Ukraine. The Russian General Staff may fear that milbloggers reporting on Ukrainian attacks against Crimea are fueling negative perceptions of Gerasimov’s competence as well as risking stimulating panic on the peninsula, whereas Russian authorities may feel comfortable letting more local officials such as Sobyanin take the fall for attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities. If this hypothesis is valid then the Kremlin’s pressure on milbloggers to censor themselves may be confined to pressure to avoid reporting on dramatic events that clearly reflect badly on Gerasimov, Shoigu, or Putin rather than to avoid discussing all negative events. Russian forces conducted a drone strike on the night of August 1-2 that destroyed port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast including 40,000 tons of grain. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike targeting Kyiv and Odesa oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 23 drones, but an unspecified number of drones struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[9] BBC Russia reported that the Russian strike destroyed 40,000 tons of grain intended for shipment to several African countries, China, and Israel at the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast.[10] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported on July 31 that Russian forces destroyed 180,000 tons of grain between Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17 and July 26.[11] The Kremlin has repeatedly pledged to send 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain to six unspecified African countries in the next three to four months free of charge--a fraction of the Ukrainian grain it has destroyed.[12] Russian forces are likely striking grain storage infrastructure while claiming that they are striking military targets, in an attempt to have Russia supplant Ukraine as the supplier of grain to Africa and other states to ensure that Moscow rather than Kyiv benefits financially. The destruction of Ukrainian grain and the disruption of grain shipments following Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and Russian posturing and threats to attack neutral shipping going to and from Ukraine are also causing grain prices to fluctuate, and the Russians may hope to benefit from higher prices if they can keep Ukrainian grain largely off the global market. Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky announced the formation of up two new VDV regiments and the reestablishment of the 104th VDV Division by the end of 2023. Teplinsky announced that the existing 31st Guards Separate VDV Assault Brigade will be subordinated to the 104th VDV Division.[13] Teplinsky claimed that one battery of a new artillery brigade (presumably of the 104th Division) is already fighting in Ukraine. The Russian military has been attempting to stand up multiple new division and army corps-level formations since the end of 2022 when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced the reconstitution of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts and the establishment of several new formations.[14] Ongoing Russian force generation efforts will likely staff the new VDV formations with new, untrained personnel rather than recruit experienced personnel more typical of the VDV’s historical elite status. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Russian MoD has likely begun staffing its new formations including the new 25th Army Corps (Central Military District), but that Russia is unlikely to recruit enough personnel to staff even one new army-level formation without conducting a general mobilization.[15] Teplinsky’s announcement indicates that he maintains his position and the public support of the Russian MoD following rumors of his arrest, possibly as a result of his affiliations with the Wagner Group, in mid-July.[16] Teplinsky credited Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for strengthening the VDV by forming new units prior to the start of the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine in a show of deference.[17] Teplinsky specifically credited Shoigu with provisioning the VDV with modern equipment and helping develop VDV formations.[18] Teplinsky has been hostile to Gerasimov and has previously directed forceful complaints against the seniormost Russian military command, setting a precedent for insubordination among other Russian military commanders.[19] Teplinsky’s public appearance and comments in direct support of the MoD command structure indicate that the MoD has coerced Teplinsky into publicly realigning with the MoD following the June 24 rebellion and July rumors of significant military command changes. The Russian MoD officially provided weapons and vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces on August 2, reallocating conventional military assets as a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to steadily expand Russia’s internal security capabilities following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24. Russian media reported that the Russian MoD provided machine guns, anti-drone guns, and UAZ vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces.[20] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov stated that Russian authorities provided each of the Belgorod Oblast Territorial Defense‘s eight battalions with five UAZ vehicles, additional car radios, quadcopters, and anti-drone guns.[21] Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit also announced that the first batch of weapons arrived in Kursk Oblast and that more weapons will arrive “in the near future.”[22] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reportedly stated that the Kremlin issued the weapons to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces against the backdrop of attacks from the territory of Ukraine.[23] The repeated allocation of additional military assets to Belgorod and Kursk oblasts indicates that the Kremlin is growing increasingly concerned about continued attacks on Russia's border with Ukraine. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on June 15 that he deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to Belgorod Oblast to protect the border from raids into Russian territory.[24] Ukrainian officials reported on June 22 that Russian forces transferred several GRU Spetsnaz units to Kursk Oblast to fight pro-Ukrainian Russian partisans.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities will store the weapons provided to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces in a centralized location and noted that it is unclear how the territorial defense forces will be able to access the weapons in an emergency if they are stored in a locked storage facility.[26] The claim that Russian authorities will lock up the weapons provided to the Belgorod and Kursk Territorial Defense forces, if true, indicates that the Kremlin is attempting to balance the need for increased border security with the need to avoid empowering decentralized military formations that might one day be able to launch an armed rebellion similar to Wagner’s actions on June 24.[27] Moscow might also fear the results of large numbers of small arms getting into the hands of poorly trained territorial forces or the general population. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) and Melitopol directions (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[28] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kurdyumivka in the Bakhmut area.[29] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line in the Lyman direction, near Staromayorske on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, and near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[30] Key Takeaways: A dispute among prominent voices in the Russian information space highlights the Kremlin’s sensitivity to Russian reporting about setbacks in Crimea in particular and possibly in Ukraine in general and has further exposed fault lines within the milblogger community. This dispute, alongside the accompanying allegations, suggests that the issue of strikes against Crimea is a distinctly neuralgic point in the pro-war Russian information space. The highest echelons of the Russian military command may have directed milbloggers to stay silent about problems that can be directly blamed on the Russian military command. Russian forces conducted a drone strike on the night of August 1-2 that destroyed port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast including 40,000 tons of grain. Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky announced the formation of up two new VDV regiments and the reestablishment of the 104th VDV Division by the end of 2023. Teplinsky’s announcement indicates that he maintains his position and the public support of the Russian MoD following rumors of his arrest, possibly as a result of his affiliations with the Wagner Group, in mid-July. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially provided weapons and vehicles to the Belgorod and Kursk Oblast Territorial Defense forces on August 2, reallocating conventional military assets as a part of the Kremlin’s efforts to steadily expand Russia’s internal security capabilities following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on August 2. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced in some areas. Russian civilians are increasingly targeting military registration and enlistment centers across Russia as a result of what Russian sources claim are targeted scam calls. Russian President Vladimir Putin pushed the Kremlin narrative of “Novorossiya” and announced Russian government initiatives to provide books to occupied territories of Ukraine on August 2. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 3, 2023 Share Posted August 3, 2023 The ISW editorial team published this article for Time: How the Ukraine Counteroffensive Can Still Succeed TIME.COM The Ukrainian counteroffensive is going slow, but success is still possible Quote The situation in Ukraine still favors Kyiv despite the limited progress made in the counteroffensive so far. Ukrainian forces attempted a limited mechanized penetration of prepared Russian defenses in the south in early to mid-June, but failed to break through the Russian lines. They then switched to slower and more careful operations while disrupting Russian rear areas with long-range precision strikes. Ukraine began the next, reportedly main, phase of its counteroffensive on July 26 with a determined drive to penetrate Russian lines in western Zaporizhia Oblast. It’s far too soon to evaluate the outcome of that effort, which is underway as of the time of this writing, but it is vital to manage expectations. Ukrainian forces are fighting now to break through the first line of long-prepared Russian defenses. Several lines lie behind it, stretching for many miles. Ukrainian progress will very likely alternate periods of notable tactical advances with periods, possibly long periods, of pause and some setbacks. Much as we might hope that the road to the Sea of Azov will simply open for Ukrainian forces the odds are high that fighting will remain hard, casualties high, and frustration will be a constant companion. All of which is normal in war. But the Ukrainian counteroffensive can succeed in any of several ways. First, the current Ukrainian mechanized breakthrough could succeed, and the Ukrainians could exploit it deeply enough to unhinge part or all of the Russian lines. Second, Russian forces, already suffering serious morale and other systemic problems, could break under the pressure and begin to withdraw in a controlled or uncontrolled fashion. Third, a steady pressure and interdiction campaign supported by major efforts such as the one now underway can generate gaps in the Russian lines that Ukrainian forces can exploit at first locally, but then for deeper penetrations. The first and second possibilities are relatively unlikely but possible. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 4, 2023 Author Share Posted August 4, 2023 Ukraine's navy carried out an unmanned naval drone strike against a Russian ship in Russian waters 700km from Ukraine. Drone had 450kg of explosives, and the Russian ship was disabled and listing heavily, was spotted being towed towards port. Likely permanently disabled. 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 4, 2023 Share Posted August 4, 2023 ISW analysis for 04 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 3, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 3 and reportedly advanced in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 3 and reportedly advanced in some areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions, and Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Bakhmut direction.[1] Ukrainian Director of the Department of Planning of the Main Directorate of the National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 650m into Russian defenses along a 1.5km front in the Melitopol direction.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast.[3] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on August 3 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive does not have a set deadline or schedule.[4] Danilov added that Russian defensive lines along the front continue to be heavily mined, with some areas having three, four, or five mines per square meter.[5] Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on August 3, primarily targeting Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 15 Iranian-made Shahed-131/136 drones launched by Russian forces on August 3.[6] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed almost a dozen targets near Kyiv on August 3.[7] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces launched the drones from occupied Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[8] Ihnat added that Russian forces have moved many drone launch sites to the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov in Krasnodar Krai due to Ukrainian strike capabilities against Crimea and Russian border regions.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) took down Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky’s August 2 speech, possibly due to his disclosure of Russian casualties in Ukraine. Teplinsky claimed on VDV Day (August 2, a holiday celebrating the Russian airborne forces) that at least 8,500 VDV personnel have been wounded in Ukraine since the start of the war, a rare official disclosure of Russian casualties, which Russian officials have largely sought to obscure as the war has progressed.[10] Russian MoD mouthpiece TV Zvezda took down Teplinsky’s August 2 speech, and some Russian sources claimed this removal was due to the casualty count.[11] BBC and opposition outlet Mediazona have confirmed that at least 1,800 VDV personnel were killed in action in Ukraine as of July 30, and a killed to wounded ratio of 1:3 is on average (if not slightly better) for Russian forces in Ukraine.[12] The Russian MoD may have also sought to censor Teplinsky’s disclosure of details regarding new VDV formations, as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and other military officials have previously discussed the establishment of other formations but not specified their names and exact subordination to existing units.[13] Teplinsky previously capitalized on Russia’s ”Defender of the Fatherland” Day on February 23 to criticize Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov about the extent of Russian casualties in Ukraine.[14] Russian prosecutors reportedly classified the investigation into ardent Russian ultranationalist and former FSB officer Igor Girkin on August 2. Girkin’s lawyer Alexander Molokhov stated that materials relevant to Girkin’s case have been classified as “top secret” and refused to issue further comments so as to not violate his non-disclosure agreements.[15] Girkin‘s supporters continued to call for the start of a movement to demand Girkin’s release via political means and claimed that Girkin is a political prisoner.[16] Girkin’s wife Miroslava Reginskaya appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin directly in a public letter for Girkin’s release, noting that Girkin’s arrest was either someone’s attempt to curry favor with unnamed officials or an effort to censor the truth about the situation on the frontlines.[17] Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 3 and reportedly advanced in some areas. Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on August 3, primarily targeting Kyiv. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) took down Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky’s August 2 speech, possibly due to his disclosure of Russian casualties in Ukraine. Russian prosecutors reportedly classified the investigation into ardent Russian ultranationalist and former FSB officer Igor Girkin on August 2. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 3 and made advances in certain areas. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 3 and reportedly advanced near Kreminna and Vuhledar. The Kremlin is attempting to establish favorable conditions to attract additional volunteers to serve in the Russian Armed Forces. A report from Yale University’s Conflict Observatory supports ISW’s longstanding assessments that Russian and occupation authorities are using forced passportization measures to consolidate social and legal control over occupied areas of Ukraine. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 4, 2023 Share Posted August 4, 2023 2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said: Ukraine's navy carried out an unmanned naval drone strike against a Russian ship in Russian waters 700km from Ukraine. Drone had 450kg of explosives, and the Russian ship was disabled and listing heavily, was spotted being towed towards port. Likely permanently disabled. Photo of the Ropucha-class LST with a pretty significant port-side list. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
b_m_b_m_b_m Posted August 4, 2023 Share Posted August 4, 2023 It curves a bit to the left. Nice Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted August 4, 2023 Share Posted August 4, 2023 That ship is done. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 4, 2023 Author Share Posted August 4, 2023 Multiple explosions at Kerch bridge. Russia military radio says UAVs and naval drones. Traffic stopped and lights are out. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 4, 2023 Author Share Posted August 4, 2023 Now reports that it was a Russian-bound oil tanker hit by a Ukrainian naval drone, near the bridge. Fog of war, etc. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 5, 2023 Share Posted August 5, 2023 ISW analysis for 04 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 4, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and port infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (a key Russian naval base) on the night of August 3 to 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on August 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and port infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (a key Russian naval base) on the night of August 3 to 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare units downed up to 13 Ukrainian drones targeting Crimea.[1] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian drones striking areas near an oil depot in Feodosia, Crimea, although it is unclear whether the drone strikes damaged Russian targets.[2] Geolocated footage published on August 3 and 4 shows Russian forces firing on Ukrainian naval drones near a Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and one of the naval drones striking the Russian Olenegorsky Gornyak Ropucha-class landing ship.[3] The Russian MoD stated that Russian naval artillery fire destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones near the base in Novorossisyk.[4] Geolocated footage posted later on August 4 shows the Olenegorsky Gornyak listing and a Russian support vessel towing the landing ship to the Novorossisyk port.[5] Geolocated footage does not indicate the full extent of the damage to the Olenegorsky Gornyak, and Russian sources claimed that the damage was not critical and that the ship would be operational after an unspecified time of repair.[6] Russian sources claimed that the Russian navy used the landing ship to transport civilian vehicles across the Kerch Strait amidst widespread disruptions to traffic across the Kerch Strait bridge.[7] Russian milbloggers characteristically lambasted the Russian MoD for lying about the naval drone strikes and called on the Russian military to escalate activities in the Black Sea. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for originally claiming that the Russian forces had intercepted all drone strikes instead of admitting that the strikes damaged the Olenegorsky Gornyak landing ship.[8] Russian milbloggers criticized the MoD for previously lying about destroying the Ukrainian drone assembly facilities and claimed that Russian forces must cut Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea in order to prevent naval drone attacks from civilian ships.[9] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russia needs to create a full-fledged monitoring system for the Black Sea to detect Ukrainian boats, as other tactics like striking Ukrainian port infrastructure have not prevented attacks in the sea.[10] Some Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian MoD lacks a cohesive information policy, which creates conditions for public outcry in the Russian information space after every Russian military failure.[11] Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[12] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue to advance on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[13] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi stated that the most important elements of the Ukrainian counteroffensive are unexpectedness and accuracy, not speed.[14] Skibitskyi noted that Ukrainian actions are aimed at cutting off Russian supply routes, destroying Russian stores of weapons and military equipment, and winning counterbattery battles.[15] Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder stated that Ukraine independently decides when and where to employ its significant combat capabilities.[16] The Kremlin continues to express its unwillingness to return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the absence of extensive concessions from the West. The Kremlin released a joint statement on August 4 following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s July 28 meeting with African leaders regarding their newly formally named African Peace Initiative.[17] The document stated that the African leaders called for concrete steps to remove obstacles to the export of Russian grain and fertilizers, and the release and delivery of 200,000 tons of Russian fertilizer stuck in European ports to African countries. These calls suggest that the African leaders support Russia’s conditions for revitalizing the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[18] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on August 4 that the United States would continue to do “whatever is necessary” to ensure that Russia can freely export food on the global market if Russia would be willing to revive the Black Sea Grain Initiative and allow Ukraine to export grain safely through the Black Sea.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Blinken’s statement by claiming that as soon as the United States fulfills Russia’s conditions, “the deal will immediately be resumed.”[20] These statements give no clear indication that Russia intends to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative and seeks to coerce the West to end limitations on its own exports. Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin reportedly facilitated the reinstatement of the commander of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, after meeting Putin’s Chief of Staff Anton Vaino on July 21.[21] Russian sources previously claimed on July 14 that the Russian military command dismissed Seliverstov for unknown reasons, but speculated that his removal could have been due to his reputation for speaking up on behalf of his forces.[22] ISW assessed on July 15 that Seliverstov’s claimed dismissal may have been a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders.[23] An unnamed source told a Russian Telegram channel (reportedly affiliated with the Russian security forces) that Dyumin bypassed the Russian MoD to reinstate Seliverstov via Vaino and the Russian Presidential Administration.[24] The source added that Dyumin’s decision to bypass the military chain of command has already sparked conflicts between the Russian Presidential Administration and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, and that Dyumin is attempting to displace Shoigu from his position. Dyumin reportedly attempted to intervene in Seliverstov’s firing during his visit to Moscow on July 14 but was unsuccessful in reversing the dismissal at that time.[25] While ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, if true, Dyumin likely advocated for Seliverstov in opposition to Shoigu or Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov or may have simply supported Seliverstov because the 106th VDV Division is headquartered in Tula Oblast. Vaino holds one of the most influential positions within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s circle and has reportedly served as an intermediatory between Putin and figures such as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.[26] Dyumin’s successful meeting with Vaino, if true, indicates that select members of the Russian Presidential Administration are able to overrule and undermine decisions made by the MoD. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.[27] Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of aerial and naval drone strikes against Russian logistics and port infrastructure in occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai (a key Russian naval base) on the night of August 3 to 4. Russian milbloggers characteristically lambasted the Russian MoD for lying about the naval drone strikes and called on the Russian military to escalate activities in the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4. The Kremlin continues to express its unwillingness to return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the absence of extensive concessions from the West. Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin reportedly facilitated the reinstatement of the commander of the Russian 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, Major General Vladimir Seliverstov, after meeting Putin’s Chief of Staff Anton Vaino on July 21. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 4. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 4 and made advances in certain areas. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that China’s “temporary” export restrictions on drones may severely impact the ability of Russian volunteers to supply drones to Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine. Russian authorities are continuing to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of summer camps. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 6, 2023 Share Posted August 6, 2023 ISW analysis for 05 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days. Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia’s B Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00 pm ET on August 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days. The Moscow Times identified the tanker as the chemical tanker SIG, which is currently under US sanctions for supplying jet fuel to Russian forces in Syria.[1] Sources within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) confirmed to the Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy struck the ship near the Kerch Strait Bridge using a naval drone.[2] The Russian Federal Agency for Sea and Inland Water Transport (Rosmorrechflot) reported that the strike on the SIG occurred 27 kilometers south of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers claimed that the attack caused Russian authorities to suspend traffic on the bridge.[3] Russian news aggregator Baza reported that the naval drone punched a two-by-one meter hole in the SIG’s engine room, and state Russian outlets claimed that the incident did not result in an oil spill.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian naval drone intentionally targeted the SIG’s engine room because targeting the stern creates the least likelihood of an oil spill and is where the most expensive and difficult-to-repair equipment is located.[5] The nature and location on the ship of the attack suggest that Ukrainian forces intended to disable the ship without generating significant ecological consequences. Ukrainian forces have long targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge in order to degrade Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine, and the attack on the SIG is likely part of a wider effort to disable ships involved in supplying Russian military forces and the location of the attack near the bridge suggests that it was part of a larger effort to disrupt Russian logistics along a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).[6] Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia’s Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17.[7] The Ukrainian State Hydrographic Service at the State Service of Maritime and River Transport posted a notice to mariners on August 4 announcing a “military threat” in the vicinity of the internal and external roadsteads at the ports of Taman, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Gelendzhik, Tuapse, and Sochi, until further notice.[8] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense also cryptically tweeted ”Two can play that game,” without further context on August 5 - likely a reference to the Russian military’s continued strikes against Odesa’s port infrastructure since July 17.[9] This Ukrainian warning may deter merchant activity and international commercial shipping to and from Russia in the Black Sea. Quote Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations. A Ukrainian naval drone struck the Russian Olenegorsky Gornyak Ropucha-class landing ship on the night of August 3 to 4.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on August 5 that the damage to the Olenegorsky Gornyak is very significant and suggested that the ship will not be operational for some time.[11] The UK Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that images of the ship show it listing at 30 to 40 degrees, which suggests either that several watertight compartments were breached by the drone strike or that the crew’s efforts to control the damage were ineffective.[12] UK MoD reported that the Olenegorsky Gornyak is typically assigned to Russia’s Northern Fleet but has lately been ferrying military and civilian traffic between Russia and occupied Crimea following traffic disruptions to the Kerch Strait Bridge caused by previous Ukrainian strikes.[13] Previous Ukrainian interdiction efforts have mainly focused on Russian military targets on land, but it seems that Ukrainian forces are now expanding their efforts to include naval targets as part of these efforts. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly stated their commitment to a deliberate interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in order to degrade Russian logistics and defensive capabilities to set favorable conditions for future Ukrainian counteroffensive activity.[14] Ukrainian forces are thus continuing to set conditions for future decisive operations via an interdiction campaign as they did before and during counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in 2022, now striking much deeper into Russian rear areas and incorporating maritime targets. Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there. Ukrainian offensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern and northern flanks have slowed in recent days, and Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report any Ukrainian ground attacks in the area on August 5.[15] The rate of Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area has also slowed in recent weeks. Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut have drawn additional Russian units and formations to the Bakhmut area and have kept Russian forces in the area, which was likely one of their primary objectives. Russian forces have deployed elite formations and units to support defensive operations around Bakhmut, including elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division, the 11th VDV Brigade, the 106th VDV Division, and the 364th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate).[16] ISW has also observed speculation that elements of the 31st VDV Brigade are now defending Bakhmut’s southern flank and inconclusive footage suggesting that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Guards Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) recently arrived in the Bakhmut direction.[17] The arrival of these units and formations in the Bakhmut area represents the commitment of a sizable amount of combat power that Russian forces could otherwise have used to support offensive operations in Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts or to reinforce Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian counteroffensive operations also appear to be successfully fixing Russian forces in this area, as ISW has yet to observe elements of these forces deploying to other parts of Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on August 4 that Russian forces are continuing to commit a large number of forces in the Bakhmut direction in hopes of recapturing recently lost dominant heights north of Bakhmut City.[18] Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia) directions. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in both areas and are advancing near Orikhiv.[19] Russian sources have routinely characterized Ukrainian attacks in southern Ukraine as up to a company in size with minimal armored vehicle or tank support.[20] These small Ukrainian ground attacks indicate that Ukrainian forces are continuing to conserve uncommitted reserves for larger mechanized attacks. Limited Ukrainian ground attacks can set conditions for larger mechanized attacks when the Ukrainian deep interdiction campaign has generated effects on the battlefield and can also support Ukrainian efforts to achieve an asymmetrical attrition gradient. Larger Ukrainian mechanized offensive operations have been sporadic since the start of the counteroffensive in early June, and ISW did not observe visual evidence or other observable signatures indicating a large assault near Orikhiv that Russian sources claimed occurred on July 26.[21] Russian sources may have exaggerated the Ukrainian attack in order to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive operations as a failure. The New York Times reported that two anonymous Pentagon officials said on July 26 the ”main thrust” of the counteroffensive had begun, although it was not clear if those officials were referring to the July 26 attack, and other unnamed US officials subsequently walked those comments back.[22] Ukrainian forces are clearly not committing to large, massed mechanized counteroffensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction as their interdiction campaign proceeds, although they continue to conduct a series of variously-sized but relatively small attacks across the front line that are having the effects of fixing Russian forces in place, tiring them, and attriting them, as ISW has previously observed.[23] Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on August 3 that the White House does not expect any “tangible deliverables” from the talks in Saudi Arabia and that the talks are a continuation of the process to promote a peace formula proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[24] Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil tanker on August 4 with a naval drone in the second attack on Russian ships in the Black Sea in two consecutive days. Ukrainian officials issued a notice to mariners that Ukraine may strike vessels near Russia’s Black Sea ports – a measured response to continued Russian strikes against Odesa – Ukraine's main port – since July 17. Ukrainian naval strikes are likely part of a deliberate interdiction campaign aimed at setting favorable conditions for larger counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces continue to draw Russian forces to the Bakhmut area and fix them there despite a slower tempo of Ukrainian operations there. Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in southern Ukraine on August 5, part of a continuing pattern of limited Ukrainian ground attacks accompanying Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian logistics and headquarters in rear areas. Senior officials from reportedly 40 countries, including the US, China, and India, began talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5 aimed at drafting a set of key principles to guide the future settlement of the war in Ukraine. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front. Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced along the Svatove-Kremmina line. Pardoned Wagner Group convict fighters continue to increase recidivism rates in Russia. Russian officials continue to transport Ukrainian children from occupied regions to Russia under the guise of summer vacations. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 6, 2023 Share Posted August 6, 2023 New video from Perun: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 6, 2023 Author Share Posted August 6, 2023 I'm at Canada's National Ukrainian Festival right now (Dauphin, MB). Last night after Canada's national dance company performed there was a really powerful moment where they turned out the lights (outdoor hillside amphitheatre in the middle of the woods, about 3,000 people), and a dozen men on horseback rode in from the hills with torches and swords, in full cossack garb (and haircuts). Then everyone used their phone lights and sang the national anthem, followed by a few powerful rounds of "Slava Ukraini!" 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 6, 2023 Author Share Posted August 6, 2023 Dances are already starting to be choreographed in reaction to the war. One is by the group Vohon from Edmonton (meaning Fire). The dance is Kuban Woloc, and celebrates the Kuban people. Short history is that The majority of people living in the Kuban region of Russia were once Ukrainian, but the Soviet Union wiped them all out (million+) during the Holodomor genocide in the 1930s. So you're starting to see cultural dances and music being made now that celebrate effectively extinct people that Russia wiped out. This war, regardless how it ends (unless Russia takes all of Ukraine, which seems unlikely) is going to be a historical inflection point where the Ukrainian culture likely once and for all separates itself entirely from any Russian influence. I'm backstage right now, here is the dance: 1 2 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 7, 2023 Share Posted August 7, 2023 ISW analysis for 06 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to longer western routes. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vadimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 12 missiles at a road bridge across the Henichesk Strait connecting Henichesk Raion to the Arabat Spit and that Russian air defenses intercepted nine of the missiles.[1] Russian sources amplified images showing significant damage to the bridge and claimed that Ukrainian strikes partially collapsed a section of the bridge.[2] Russian sources amplified footage showing Ukrainian forces striking the Chonhar road bridge along the M-18 (Dzhankoi-Melitopol) highway connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast and subsequent minor damage to both sides of the bridge.[3] Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two missiles at the bridge and that one missile made it through Russian air defenses and damaged the roadbed of the road bridge.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles to conduct both strikes, although ISW has yet to observe confirmation of Russian forces intercepting Storm Shadow cruise missiles.[5] Quote Aksyonov announced that repair work is underway at the Chonhar bridge and that Russian officials will reroute all traffic through the Armyansk and Perekop checkpoints along the M-17 (Armyansk-Oleshky) and T2202 (Armyansk-Nova Kakhovka) highways.[6] The Crimean occupation transport ministry announced that all traffic through the Dzhankoi checkpoint along the M-18 highway is closed but that traffic along the Kerch Strait bridge and the Kerch Strait ferry crossing is operating normally.[7] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) suspended civilian entry to the Arabat Spit as of July 31, and Russian officials have not commented on the status of traffic along the Henichesk-Arabat Spit GLOC.[8] The extent of the damage to the bridge across the Henichesk Strait is likely forcing Russian forces to redirect military traffic from the Arabat Spit to longer western routes between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast. The M-17 highway passes through Armyansk before branching at a junction with the T2202 highway to the north and continuing to the northwest, meaning that most if not all Russian road traffic between Crimea and Kherson Oblast will have to pass along or very close to one 20km section of the M-17 between Ishun and Armyansk. This major bottleneck in Russian GLOCs will likely pose significant disruptions to logistics and chances for delays and traffic jams. It is unclear how quickly Russian officials will be able to repair the Chonhar bridge and it is equally as unclear if Russian officials have repaired the Chonhar railway bridge that Ukrainian forces struck on July 29.[9] The damage to the Henichesk Strait bridge will likely take Russian officials substantially longer to repair. Russian GLOCs along the T2202 northwest of Crimea - especially routes along primary and trunk roads south of Nova Kakhovka - are closer to Ukrainian positions in upper Kherson Oblast and in many cases within artillery range of the Ukrainian-held western bank of the river. Russian forces likely can reduce risks from Ukrainian indirect fire in this area by taking slower and less efficient village roads northeast of Chaplynka, but at the cost of slower and more complicated logistics support. Ukrainian strikes on bridges along critical Russian GLOCs are a part of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign focused on setting conditions for future decisive counteroffensive operations. A prominent Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger argued that the Ukrainian strikes on August 6 show that Ukrainian forces are methodically trying to cut off the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine and disrupt its logistics in a way similar to the Ukrainian interdiction campaign during the Kherson counteroffensive.[10] The milblogger noted that Russian defenses on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast broke down in a matter of days following months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics and expressed concern that the situation could repeat itself.[11] The Ukrainian strikes on the eastern crossing points will likely disrupt the transport of Russian personnel, materiel, and equipment from occupied Crimea to critical Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area for some, undetermined, time. Ukrainian forces appear to be also expanding their interdiction efforts to target Russian naval targets involved in Russian logistics in the Black Sea as ISW has previously observed.[12] Ukrainian officials have routinely stated their commitment to a deliberate interdiction campaign against Russian military targets to degrade Russian logistics and defensive capabilities to set favorable conditions for future Ukrainian counteroffensive activity.[13] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[14] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian offensive operations near Bakhmut.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview published on August 5 that Ukrainian forces are advancing faster around Bakhmut than in southern Ukraine.[16] Budanov also stated that Russian forces have built stationary, fully equipped, concrete-filled defense posts in southern Ukraine, making the Ukrainian offensive there difficult.[17] Russian forces conducted one of the largest missile and drone strike series on Ukraine in recent months on the night of August 5-6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched the first wave of strikes on the night of August 5 consisting of 14 Kalibr cruise missiles and three Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched a second wave of strikes on August 6 consisting of 27 Shahed-131/136 drones, six Kalibr missiles, and 20 Kh-101/555 air-launched cruise missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed drones, five Kalibr missiles, and 13 Kh-101/555 missiles.[19] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on August 6 that Russian attacks targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast and noted that this is not the first time that Russian forces have attacked the airfield.[20] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russians targeted the Starokostyantyniv airfield because Ukrainian forces store foreign-supplied missiles including Storm Shadow cruise missiles at warehouses on the base and because the Ukrainian aviation unit that operates at the base is the only one with Storm Shadow missiles.[21] ISW has not observed any evidence to confirm these claims, however. The milbloggers’ claims that Russian forces specifically targeted an area where Ukrainian forces allegedly store and launch Storm Shadow missiles suggests that Russian forces are increasingly concerned about Ukraine’s interdiction campaign. Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian air defenses have destroyed 3,500 aerial targets since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on August 6 that Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted and destroyed 3,500 aerial targets, including 350 Russian fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 1,200 cruise missiles, including 13 hypersonic Russian "Kinzhal" Kh-47M2 missiles, and 24 ballistic missiles.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 6 that Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted and destroyed over 2,000 Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (types unspecified) and that Ukrainian pilots have conducted over 14,000 sorties since February 24, 2022.[23] International talks aimed at drafting the main principles for a future settlement to the war in Ukraine continued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 6. Diplomats from 42 countries including the US, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, India, and China reportedly agreed that future peace talks between Ukraine and Russia should be based on principles of international law, such as respect for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[24] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak reported that the Ukrainian delegation spoke with representatives from each country present at the meeting.[25] Chinese diplomats reportedly reintroduced China’s 12-point peace plan from February 2023, prompting European delegations to respond that an unconditional ceasefire would create a frozen conflict and allow Russia to consolidate its control over occupied Ukrainian territories.[26] The Wall Street Journal reported on August 6 that most countries in attendance in Saudi Arabia, including China, agreed to meet again in the near future in a similar format that again would not include Russia.[27] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an unclear and contradictory answer to a New York Times reporter who asked whether Russia seeks to conquer more Ukrainian territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022. The New York Times reported that Peskov said, “No... We just want to control all the land we have now written into our Constitution as ours,” when asked whether Russia seeks to capture more territory in Ukraine.[28] Peskov’s seemingly straightforward answer is contradictory, vague, and does not answer the reporter’s original question. Russian forces do not fully occupy the four oblasts — Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts — that the Russian government formally claims. Russian forces would have to conduct significant offensive operations to capture over 16,000 square kilometers of land in these four oblasts to bring de facto Russian-occupied territory in line with the Russian constitution as Peskov described. Russia also occupies territory in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and in Mykolaiv Oblast (the Kinburn Spit) — territory that the Kremlin has not formally annexed. Peskov’s statement implies that Russian forces should relinquish their territory in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts, but the Russian government has made no indication that it plans to do so and, in fact, is continuing offensive operations to gain more territory in Kharkiv. The Kremlin likely seeks to continue significant military operations against Ukraine to – at a minimum – capture the remaining parts of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts that Russian forces do not yet occupy. The Kremlin has articulated further maximalist objectives in Ukraine beyond that, including changing the Ukrainian government and constitution.[29] Peskov also strangely stated that Russia’s presidential election is “not really democracy” but rather a “costly bureaucracy” and that Russian President Vladimir Putin “will be re-elected next year with more than 90 percent of the vote,” but walked back on this statement the same day it was publicized.[30] Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces struck two key road bridges along critical Russian grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on August 6, causing Russian forces to reroute road traffic from shorter eastern routes to longer western routes. Ukrainian strikes on bridges along critical Russian GLOCs are a part of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign focused on setting conditions for future decisive counteroffensive operations. Russian forces conducted one of the largest missile and drone strike series on Ukraine in recent months on the night of August 5-6. Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian air defenses have destroyed 3,500 aerial targets since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. International talks aimed at drafting the main principles for a future settlement to the war in Ukraine continued in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 6. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an unclear and contradictory answer to a New York Times reporter who asked whether Russia seeks to conquer more Ukrainian territory beyond the four partially occupied oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 6. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast August 6 and made advances in certain areas. Russian military command finally allowed personnel of the Russian “Alga” volunteer battalion – which has been involved in the most intense combat on the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast since Fall 2022 – to return to Russia on leave. Russian occupation authorities in Ukraine continue establishing institutional linkages between Russian and Ukrainian governance structures and social services in occupied Ukraine. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 8, 2023 Share Posted August 8, 2023 ISW analysis for 07 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that fighting is ongoing south of Bakhmut and that eastern Ukraine has been the epicenter of hostilities in the past week.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged in an interview published on August 6 with Argentine news outlet La Nacion that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected and stated that patience is necessary in order for Ukraine to win.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are in the offensive phase of operations and continue to hold the initiative.[4] Russian forces and occupation administrators continue to seek to mitigate the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes on logistics nodes along key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian strikes on the Chonhar and Henichesk bridges were intended to specifically target Russian plans and strategies and inhibit the ability of Russian forces to bring supplies and personnel to the front.[5] Humenyuk also emphasized that Russian forces must now route supplies and personnel through Armyansk, directly on the border between Kherson Oblast and Crimea and within 80km of the frontline.[6] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo reported that his administration has temporarily changed the logistics and vehicle crossing routes between occupied Kherson and Crimea due to damage to the Chonhar Bridge, including the suspension of bus traffic between Simferopol, Crimea and Henichesk, Kherson Oblast.[7] Russian milbloggers notably did not comment on the aftermath of the strikes on August 7, further supporting ISW’s previous assessment that Russian officials may have directed Russian correspondents to not offer commentary on Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics nodes in Crimea to avoid generating panic within the information space.[8] Russian opposition media outlet Verstka suggested that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are directly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs.[9] Verstka reported that the Russian Investigative Committee “took patronage” over Ukrainian children living in children‘s homes throughout Russia, and sent its employees to 10 such homes with toys, clothes, and school supplies in order to coerce the children to enter the Russian cadet corps. Verstka reported that Bastrykin personally visited Ukrainian children in Russia and told them that Russian victory depend on the children and that the Russian Investigative Committee is there to support them. Verstka reported that the Investigative Committee previously advertised the cadet corps to Ukrainian children from Donbas and stated that 78 Ukrainian children entered educational institutions, including the cadet corps and academies affiliated with the Investigative Committee, between February 2022 and March 2023. Verstka reported that Bastrykin ordered the cadet corps in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Volgograd to prepare to receive Ukrainian children from occupied Donbas as early as February 25, 2022. Verstka highlighted statements from Ukrainian children who said they felt compelled to participate in the Russian cadet corps due to the educational opportunity. The coercion of Ukrainian children, who are legally unable to consent to their deportations and participation in such military-patriotic re-education programs, is likely part of an ongoing Russian campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian national identity and militarize youth who have been forcibly deported to Russia. China's increasing misalignment with Russia on any settlement to end the war in Ukraine was reportedly evident at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5-6. The Financial Times reported that the Chinese representatives at the meeting were “constructive” and “keen to show that [China] is not Russia.”[10] The Financial Times quoted one European diplomat present at the talks as saying that the “mere presence of China shows Russia is more and more isolated.”[11] The Chinese delegation reportedly indicated its willingness to attend the next meeting of a similar format that will likely also exclude Russia.[12] A Russian insider source alleged that Russia has rejected China's 12-point peace plan for the war in Ukraine from February 2023 (which the Chinese delegation re-introduced during the talks in Saudi Arabia) and that some Chinese elites are secretly expressing their dissatisfaction with the actions of the Russian leadership regarding a peaceful settlement of the war in Ukraine.[13] These reports from the talks in Saudi Arabia and insider allegations, if true, align with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not fully aligned with Russia on the issue of Ukraine and that Russia and China’s relationship is not a “no limits partnership” as the Kremlin desires.[14] The Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Saudi Arabia presented a 10-point peace plan that reportedly included calls for global food security, nuclear safety, environmental security, humanitarian aid, and prisoner releases.[15] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff reported that all of the members of BRICS besides Russia – Brazil, India, China, and South Africa – attended the talks.[16] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova predictably responded to the Ukrainian peace plan, calling it a “meaningless ultimatum, which is aimed at protracting hostilities.”[17] Zakharova thereby repeated a longstanding Russian information operation that absurdly claims that Russia, unlike Ukraine, “has always been and will remain open to a diplomatic solution” to the war in Ukraine.[18] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on August 7. Ukrainian officials reported that 22 Ukrainian soldiers returned to Ukraine and did not state how many Russian POWs returned to Russia.[19] Official Russian sources have not reported on the POW exchange and Russian milbloggers have notably not commented on it either. Russian milbloggers have often criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) when POW exchanges are not carried out on a one-to-one ratio between Ukrainian and Russian personnel.[20] Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 7. Russian forces and occupation administrators continue to seek to mitigate the impact of recent Ukrainian strikes on logistics nodes along key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting occupied Crimea with occupied Kherson Oblast. Russian opposition media outlet Verstka suggested that the Russian Investigative Committee and its head, Alexander Bastrykin, are directly involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and the forced placement of Ukrainian children into Russian military training programs. China's increasing misalignment with Russia on any settlement to end the war in Ukraine was reportedly evident at the talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on August 5-6. The Ukrainian delegation at the talks in Saudi Arabia presented a 10-point peace plan that reportedly included calls for global food security, nuclear safety, environmental security, humanitarian aid, and prisoner releases. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on August 7. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and made advances in certain areas. The Kremlin continues efforts to portray itself as adequately mobilizing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort. Russian occupation authorities continue to use maternity capital benefits to coerce Ukrainian civilians in occupied territories to accept Russian citizenship and increase social control in occupied areas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 9, 2023 Share Posted August 9, 2023 ISW analysis for 08 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. Several Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. Several Russian milbloggers reported on August 8 that Ukrainian forces landed up to seven boats, each carrying around six to seven people, on the east bank of the Dnipro near the settlement of Kozachi Laheri, broke through Russian defensive lines, and advanced up to 800 meters deep.[1] A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian command recently redeployed a “prepared grouping” of Russian airborne (VDV) personnel from the Kozachi Lopan area to Zaporizhia Oblast and replaced them with mobilized fighters from an unspecified unit, thereby weakening Russian defensive power in this area.[2] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo downplayed reports of the Ukrainian landing and claimed that Russian artillery fire repelled the Ukrainian boats and that there are no Ukrainian troops near Kozachi Lopan.[3] However, the majority of prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to utilize tactical surprise and land on the east bank before engaging Russian forces in small arms exchanges, and Saldo was likely purposefully trying to refute claims of Ukrainian presence in this area to avoid creating panic in the already-delicate Russian information space.[4] Hotspots on available NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from the past 24 hours in this area appear to confirm that there was significant combat, likely preceded or accompanied by artillery fire. By the end of the day on August 8, many Russian sources had updated their claims to report that Russian forces retain control over Kozachi Laheri, having pushed Ukrainian forces back to the shoreline, and that small arms skirmishes are occurring in shoreline areas near Kozachi Laheri and other east bank settlements.[5] Quote ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that there are a substantial number of Ukrainian personnel or the deployment of Ukrainian vehicles near Kozachi Laheri, and the current pattern of Russian reporting is more consistent with a limited cross-river raid than a wider Ukrainian operation. Ukrainian officials have not commented on operations in this area as of this writing. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks around Bakhmut.[7] The New York Times reported on August 7 that a Ukrainian battalion commander operating in southern Ukraine described counteroffensive operations as a “marathon” and “not a sprint.”[8] Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war. The Russian and Chinese foreign ministries portrayed the conversation between Lavrov and Wang differently. The Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Lavrov and Wang “touched on a series of ‘hot’ regional topics including the Ukrainian crisis,” while the Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that the Russian and Chinese sides “exchanged views” about the war.[9] The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s description of the talks may suggest that the Kremlin is becoming dissatisfied with China’s continued efforts to promote its peace plan in international fora, which is consistent with ISW’s previous assessments that China is not interested in a “no-limits partnership” with Russia as the Kremlin desires. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space. Several Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers and another milblogger posted an audio file on August 8 of Prigozhin discussing US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s trip to Niger on August 7.[10] Prigozhin claimed that he is proud of Wagner’s actions in Africa and suggested that the threat of future Wagner involvement in Niger prompted Nuland’s trip.[11] Prigozhin is likely attempting to co-opt Nuland’s trip to Niger to grandstand on one of the few threats he still has the power to execute after realizing that the fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 is making him increasingly irrelevant in the Russian information space. Key Takeaways: Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. ISW will continue to offer a conservative assessment of the situation on the east bank of Kherson Oblast until or unless ISW observes visual confirmation of an enduring Ukrainian presence near Kozachi Lopan or other east bank settlements. Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Communist Party Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi following China’s participation in the peace talks in Saudi Arabia suggest that China is increasingly diverging with Russia on proposed settlements to end the war. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is using the recent coup in Niger and Wagner’s continued presence in Africa to maintain relevance in the Russian information space. Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line, in the eastern Donetsk-western Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Donetsk Oblast on August 8 and made advances in certain areas. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 8 and made advances near Svatove. Russia continues to draw from its stock of Soviet-era equipment to compensate for equipment losses in Ukraine. Russian occupation authorities are preparing for regional elections in occupied areas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 9, 2023 Author Share Posted August 9, 2023 Yeah, it's been interesting to see what Ukraine is doing on the Dnipro—they haven't committed large forces to a river crossing, but they are clearly able to do whatever they want there, the Russians are incredibly weak. Would be interesting to see if they try anything major. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 10, 2023 Author Share Posted August 10, 2023 Someone (but no one is saying who) bought 50 Leopard I tanks from Germany and is updating them and giving them to Ukraine. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 10, 2023 Share Posted August 10, 2023 ISW analysis for 09 August 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed. A Russian in Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on August 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed. A Russian insider source claimed on August 8 that Wagner forces are conducting their first stage of withdrawal from Belarus by bussing groups of 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and that the second stage will begin after August 13.[1] The insider source and a Wagner-affiliated source speculated that Wagner forces may be leaving Belarus because Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko refused to finance Wagner when he discovered that Russia would not be paying for Wagner as he had evidently expected.[2] Putin and Lukashenko allowed Wagner forces and Prigozhin to continue to operate in Belarus after the armed rebellion.[3] The insider source claimed that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces.[4] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Wagner forces moving out of Belarus, however. The insider source claimed on August 6 that Wagner forces that did not deploy to Libya “urgently” went on leave in Russia, and that Wagner's command called on their fighters to keep in touch because new orders could come at any time.[5] Wagner-affiliated sources claimed that the main Wagner forces will “activate” at the end of August but did not elaborate on the statement.[6] Claims that Wagner forces are moving out of Belarus — a relatively safe haven for Wagner and Prigozhin — back to Russia, Wagner command’s mentions of new orders, and claims of the future “activation” of Wagner forces at the end of August likely suggest that aspects of the deal that allowed Wagner to move to Belarus and continue operations there and in Africa have collapsed. The validity of these claims and the future of the Wagner Group remain unclear at the time of publication. ISW offers the following assessments and hypotheses for the potential implications of these claims, if true, on the Russian power composition, Putin’s regime, and the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to integrate Wagner personnel into conventional Russian formations. ISW will continue to monitor and report on indicators and counter-indicators that support, undermine, or inform these hypotheses and assessments. Putin is likely still concerned about the threat that Prigozhin poses to his long-term goals and continues to focus on definitively separating Prigozhin from Wagner. Putin has previously attempted to present Prigozhin as corrupt and a liar to destroy his reputation among Wagner personnel and within Russian society and to rhetorically separate Prigozhin from Wagner.[7] ISW assessed on June 27 that the Kremlin would likely continue to attack Prigozhin’s character to break Prigozhin’s popular support, discourage Wagner personnel from following him to Belarus, and destroy his financial power.[8] Putin’s June 29 meeting with Prigozhin and 35 Wagner commanders further indicated that Putin intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up while also seeking to separate Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces.[9] Prigozhin’s presence at a Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18 and on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg on July 27 suggests that Prigozhin has maintained his position as the effective leader of the Wagner Group and that Putin has thus far failed to separate Prigozhin from Wagner.[10] A Russian insider source claimed on August 9 that the Kremlin’s rhetorical attacks against Prigozhin decreased dramatically after Putin’s meeting with Wagner leadership on June 29, but began to increase again in early August.[11] An increase in Kremlin attacks on Prigozhin, if true, could indicate that Putin has recommitted to his original goal of destroying Prigozhin and creating a clear separation between Prigozhin and Wagner. Putin’s prioritization of separating Prigozhin from Wagner and attempting to maintain a reconstituted Wagner fighting element appears to be at odds with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s objectives. A Russian insider source claimed that Shoigu has taken over Russia’s relationships with African countries from Prigozhin, angering the Wagner leadership and personnel and depriving Wagner of opportunities in Africa.[12] If true, Shoigu’s ambitions in Africa are likely to create issues for Putin’s greater goals with Wagner by angering the very people Putin is trying to woo. Putin’s and Shoigu’s priorities have become periodically misaligned throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, often when Putin prioritizes balancing competing groups and interests while Shoigu attempts to establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.[13] Alternatively, Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia in order to facilitate the destruction or restructuring of Wagner. Putin appealed to Wagner commanders in a speech on July 26 seeking to persuade them to continue to fight in Ukraine by joining the Russian military.[14] Putin’s appeal may have suggested that the Kremlin intended to organize Wagner forces into the Russian MoD. This appeal appears not to have been successful as many Wagner personnel deployed to Belarus and individual Wagner commanders and personnel continued to express loyalty to Wagner and Prigozhin.[15] The Kremlin has also reportedly attempted to control Wagner’s operations in the Middle East and subordinate Wagner's operations there to the Russian MoD following the rebellion on June 24.[16] Wagner commanders released a statement on August 9 claiming that Wagner fighters have been receiving calls advertising opportunities to work with other private military companies (PMCs) in Africa.[17] The calls may suggest that the Russian government seeks to lure Wagner personnel away from Wagner with new work opportunities. Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia so that he can more easily facilitate Wagner’s subordination to the Russian MoD or disband the organization entirely. There are other possible outcomes that would see Wagner reconstitute as a unitary fighting force reminiscent of its operations in Ukraine, although ISW has observed no indicators for these outcomes, which appear unlikely based on available information. The Kremlin’s likeliest courses of action vis-à-vis Wagner will likely lead to an overall decrease in the combat power that Wagner could offer the Russian military, as either approach will likely dissuade some elements of Wagner from continuing to serve, whether in a Wagner without Prigozhin or in some type of entity completely subordinated to the MoD. The likely collapse of aspects of the Wagner-Putin-Lukashenko deal indicates that Putin has failed to decisively resolve issues posed by Prigozhin and Wagner following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion. Putin is unlikely to resolve the Wagner problem as long as tensions remain between Putin’s own aim of separating Prigozhin from Wagner and Shoigu’s aims to secure full MoD control over Wagner and the other armed forces fighting for Russia. Speculations about Shoigu taking over Russian military operations in Africa from Wagner, if true, will likely only exacerbate tensions between the MoD and Wagner personnel returning from Belarus or Africa to Russia rather than persuading the Wagner personnel to join conventional Russian military formations in accord with the prior deal.[18] Pro-Wagner sources have historically coalesced around Prigozhin because of anger at the MoD and likely retain the ability to rally the support of Wagner rank-and-file and supporters regardless of Prigozhin‘s actual participation in current rhetoric.[19] Angering Wagner personnel further while bringing them back to Russia poses challenges if Putin seeks to eliminate the Wagner threat. Putin’s decision to allow Shoigu to undermine this aspect of the prior deal, if true, then threatens to undermine the careful façade of internal security that Putin has extensively attempted to project following the June 24 rebellion.[20] This situation is evolving dynamically in an increasingly complicated information environment marked by the absence of direct commentary from Prigozhin or other Wagner leaders. ISW will continue to evaluate these and other hypotheses and assessments as more information becomes available. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to justify the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts by reamplifying boilerplate rhetoric posturing NATO as an existential threat to Russia. Shoigu opened a meeting of the Russian MoD Collegium on August 9, focusing on issues related to the creation of the two military districts but primarily commented on Western support for Ukraine and NATO’s expansion.[21] Shoigu stated that the NATO countries’ attempts to help Ukraine win are creating serious risks for further escalation and that Finland’s accession and Sweden’s planned accession to NATO are “a serious destabilizing factor.”[22] Shoigu stated that it is likely that NATO will deploy military contingents and strike weapons on Finnish territory that can strike critical targets in Russia, and Shoigu accused NATO of intentionally militarizing Poland as part of America’s alleged anti-Russia policy.[23] Shoigu stated that Eastern European militaries have a combined manpower of 360,000 personnel with 8,000 armored vehicles, 6,000 artillery systems, and 650 aviation units deployed to the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Union State.[24] Shoigu suggested that the Russian MoD is strengthening the Russian grouping of forces along Russia’s western borders to respond to these alleged threats.[25] Shoigu announced on January 17, 2023, that the MoD will reestablish the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts as part of long-term goals to significantly increase the size of the Russian military.[26] Shoigu is likely framing the recreation of these military districts as a necessary response to alleged Western aggression towards Russia in order to justify the cost of resources, time, and institutional capacity required for their recreation. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[27] Geolocated footage published on August 9 suggests that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but the duration and extent of these advances are currently unclear.[28] Ukrainian Tavriisk Operational and Strategic Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhii Kuzmin stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces reached the Russian first line of defense in an unspecified area in the Melitopol or Berdyansk directions.[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on August 9 that Ukrainian forces were partially successful south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Pryyutne and southeast of Orikhiv near Verbove.[30] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and suggested that Ukrainian forces may have captured some Russian positions south of Bakhmut.[31] Malyar stated that the Ukrainian forces are conducting the counteroffensive as expected and are successfully degrading Russian offensive potential as Ukrainian forces did during the summer-autumn 2022 interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast.[32] The Russian veteran community may be attempting to rehabilitate the nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, following scrutiny over his affiliation with the Wagner Group. Surovikin’s former commander, Colonel General Valeriy Marchenkov, told state affiliated URA.ru outlet that Surovikin did not and could not ever renege on his oath and praised Surovikin for pioneering a defensive strategy that is slowing down Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine.[33] Marchenkov claimed that Surovikin successfully reduced the frontline length and strategically redistributed Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast. Marchenkov also defended Surovikin’s decision to withdraw Russian troops from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in November 2022, stating that this decision allowed Russian forces to construct the current defensive lines in Kherson Oblast and prevent military and civilian deaths. Marchenkov also attributed the creation of the Russian military police to Surovikin and boasted about Surovikin’s efforts to suppress the August 1991 coup in Moscow. Russian veterans communities were instrumental in rehabilitating and promoting Surovikin’s claimed affiliate, Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, in March-April 2023.[34] Russian VDV veterans appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on behalf of Teplinsky, after which Teplinsky returned to the frontlines ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[35] Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army Major General Ivan Popov has also rallied veteran and army groups, sparking a discussion around his removal from command in mid-July.[36] Marchenkov’s interview may suggest that Surovikin and the anti-Gerasimov faction believe there is a chance for Surovikin to return to the frontlines. Marchenkov’s public defense of Surovikin is in line with previous veteran efforts to secure the reinstatement of commanders who oppose Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov. Marchenkov notably did not publicly disclose Surovikin’s whereabouts. One Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin’s agreements with Wagner began to “sag,” a claim that accords with ISW’s assessments as noted above, which the source claimed can explain the lack of a new appointment for Surovikin.[37] ISW assessed on April 30 that Putin fails to decisively dismiss commanders and instead demotes them in order to encourage them to seek to regain his favor and to retain options for future appointments.[38] Surovikin’s return to command will likely depend on his ability to convince Putin of his loyalty and usefulness on the battlefield – both narratives presented in Marchenkov’s interview. Russian sources claimed that poor safety regulations led to an explosion near the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant in Moscow on August 9, and notably, most Russian sources did not suggest that Ukrainian actors may have been responsible for the incident.[39] The explosion caused widespread damage to the plant and surrounding areas, injured at least 60 people, and killed at least one person.[40] The explosion reportedly occurred at a facility at the plant leased by Russian pyrotechnics company PiroRoss, and the Russian authorities have reportedly opened a criminal case against PiroRoss for the violation of industrial safety requirements.[41] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities have detained PiroRoss Director Sergei Chanakev in connection with the explosion.[42] Shvabe Holding Company, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, owns the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant, and the plant produces pyrotechnics and precision optical equipment for the military.[43] Russian media outlet Agentstvo reported that the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant has also been participating in the development of a next-generation strategic stealth bomber “Poslannik” since 2019.[44] Key Takeaways: Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed. Putin is likely still concerned about the threat that Prigozhin poses to his long-term goals and continues to focus on definitively separating Prigozhin from Wagner. Alternatively, Putin may intend for Wagner's forces to return to Russia in order to facilitate the destruction or restructuring of Wagner. The likely collapse of aspects of the Wagner-Putin-Lukashenko deal indicates that Putin has failed to decisively resolve issues posed by Prigozhin and Wagner following Wagner’s June 24 rebellion. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to justify the recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts by reamplifying boilerplate rhetoric posturing NATO as an existential threat to Russia. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9. The Russian veteran community may be attempting to rehabilitate the nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, following scrutiny over his affiliation with the Wagner Group. Marchenkov’s interview may suggest that Surovikin and the anti-Gerasimov faction believe there is a chance for Surovikin to return to the frontlines. Russian sources claimed that poor safety regulations led to an explosion near the Zagorsk Optical Mechanical Plant in Moscow on August 9, and notably most Russian sources did not suggest that Ukrainian actors may have been responsible for the incident. Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced on the Svatove-Kreminna line, north of Bakhmut, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on August 9. Footage published on August 9 further supports ISW’s assessments that the Ukrainian incursion near Kozachi Laheri in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on August 8 was likely a limited raid. Russian forces may be moving military equipment through Kazakhstan to Russia, but ISW has observed no geolocated footage confirming these reports. Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to justify the possible need to cancel or postpone regional elections in the occupied territories in case of Ukrainian counteroffensive successes Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 10, 2023 Share Posted August 10, 2023 Unsurprisingly, the seemingly slow to non-existent pace of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is having a negative impact on domestic morale: Slow counteroffensive darkens mood in Ukraine - The Washington Post WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM Nearly 18 months after Russia's invasion engulfed Ukrainians in a brutal war, the national narrative of unity and perseverance is beginning to fray. Quote This nation is worn out. For nearly 18 months, Ukraine has stood against its Russian invaders — rallying support for its troops by embracing last year’s battlefield victories in the Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson regions. Those wins carried beleaguered Ukrainians through a winter of airstrikes on civilian infrastructure and a brutal and symbolic battle for Bakhmut, the eastern city that fell to the Russians in May. Throughout, Ukrainian officials and their western partners hyped up a coming counteroffensive — one that, buoyed by a flood of new weapons and training, they hoped would turn the tide of the war. But two months after Ukraine went on the attack, with little visible progress on the front and a relentless, bloody summer across the country, the narrative of unity and endless perseverance has begun to fray. The number of dead — untold thousands — increases daily. Millions are displaced and see no chance of returning home. In every corner of the country, civilians are exhausted from a spate of recent Russian attacks — including strikes on a historic cathedral in Odessa, a residential building in Kryvyi Rih and a blood transfusion center in the Kharkiv region. This week, two Russian missiles hit a single block in the eastern town of Pokrovsk — where an evacuation train regularly picks up people fleeing front-line areas nearby — killing civilians and emergency workers who rushed there to save them. Ukrainians, much in need of good news, are simply not getting any. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted August 10, 2023 Author Share Posted August 10, 2023 While that article is largely true, it also reeks of classic WaPo "true Americans in town diner" opinions to get the story they want. I know many Ukrainians (both here, and in Ukraine)—while they are disappointed in the lack of progress (in terms of ground movement), there is very little "fraying" of unity, or the goal of this war. It's not like a large number are calling for surrender or capitulation. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted August 11, 2023 Share Posted August 11, 2023 Metro 2033 author Dmitry Glukhovsky sentenced to 8 years in prison for criticizing Russia's invasion of Ukraine | PC Gamer WWW.PCGAMER.COM Glukhovsky was found guilty of posting social media messages accusing Russian soldiers of committing crimes in Ukraine. Quote An Associated Press report says Metro 2033 author Dmitry Glukhovsky has been sentenced to eight years in prison after being found guilty of spreading false information about the Russian military in online posts. Charges were first leveled against Glukhovsky in June 2022, a few months after the Russian government outlawed independent reporting and protest of the invasion of Ukraine. The charges appeared to arise from a March 12 Instagram post in which Glukhovsky invoked the city of Mariupol, which stood for months as a focal point of Ukrainian resistance, and called on readers to "recognize that this is a real war against an entire nation and stop it!" Quote Glukhovsky became known to gamers through the FPS based on his novel Metro 2033, developed by Ukrainian studio 4A Games and released in 2010. It became a surprise hit and spawned two sequels, Metro: Last Light and Metro Exodus; they did not follow the events of his sequel novels, Metro 2034 and Metro 2035, but he worked on the Last Light script with 4A Games and is credited with "inspiring" Exodus. Fortunately for Glukhovsky, he is not actually in Russia, and was sentenced in absentia. His current whereabouts are unknown. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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